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Abstract
Americans spent 13,400 person-years waiting in emergency departments (EDs) in 2009 alone, a figure that
has been increasing at a compounded rate of 3.5% per year since at least the early 1990s. Furthermore, the
quantity of emergency department services demanded has increased by 3.1% annually, but the supply of ED
services has not increased concomitantly. This dissertation develops a theoretical model which explains this
lack of supply response. In the model, consistent with anecdotal and cross-sectional evidence, hospitals are
constrained from setting individual wait times based on non-clinical factors. However, the hospital chooses an
overall set of policies (staffing levels, adoption of operations management innovations, etc.) which produces a
hospital-wide baseline wait time. The hospital's wait time is endogenous to the mix of patient profitabilities.
Demand depends on the time price of services. The model predicts that higher wait times result from
increased proportions of Medicaid and uninsured patients.
A novel census of emergency department wait times in two states (MA, NJ) is used to test these predictions.
First, the model's assumption that hospitals are constrained in setting individual wait times based on
profitability is supported by cross-sectional regression coefficients: hospitals with 50 percentage point greater
uninsurance rates have 26.0 minute longer wait times (p<.01; national mean wait time is 58 minutes), whereas
conditional on hospital uninsurance rate individuals who are uninsured are not shown to have longer wait
times (coefficient of 0.86 minutes, p=0.13). Next I use cross-sectional models which instrument for area
uninsurance/Medicaid rates, models assessing the effect of entry of urgent care clinics into the market (since
these clinics see predominantly insured, less severely injured patients), and triple-difference estimates of the
differential effect of Massachusetts' insurance expansion across the change in hospital insurance mix. Results
support the theoretical model's conclusions.
The recent national expansion of insurance may mitigate the negative externality on the privately insured,
providing a substantial welfare gain to those who do not otherwise benefit from the Affordable Care Act.
Given the uncertainty as to the marginal costs of ED care, however, the full welfare implications are unknown.
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ABSTRACT
FIRM RESPONSE TO LOW-REIMBURSEMENT PATIENTS IN THE MARKET
FOR UNSCHEDULED OUTPATIENT CARE
Ari B. Friedman
Mark V. Pauly
Americans spent 13,400 person-years waiting in emergency departments (EDs) in
2009 alone, a figure that has been increasing at a compounded rate of 3.5A novel
census of emergency department wait times in two states (MA, NJ) is used to test
these predictions. First, the model’s assumption that hospitals are constrained in
setting individual wait times based on profitability is supported by cross-sectional
regression coefficients: hospitals with 50 percentage point greater uninsurance rates
have 26.0 minute longer wait times (p<.01; national mean wait time is 58 minutes),
whereas conditional on hospital uninsurance rate individuals who are uninsured are
not shown to have longer wait times (coefficient of 0.86 minutes, p=0.13). Next I use
cross-sectional models which instrument for area uninsurance/Medicaid rates, models
assessing the effect of entry of urgent care clinics into the market (since these clinics see
predominantly insured, less severely injured patients), and triple-difference estimates
of the differential effect of Massachusetts’ insurance expansion across the change in
hospital insurance mix. Results support the theoretical model’s conclusions. The
recent national expansion of insurance may mitigate the negative externality on the
privately insured, providing a substantial welfare gain to those who do not otherwise
benefit from the Affordable Care Act. Given the uncertainty as to the marginal costs
of ED care, however, the full welfare implications are unknown.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction, background, and overview
1.1. Introduction
Emergency Department (ED) crowding–which for the present purposes can be viewed
as excess quantity demanded relative to quantity supplied–has increased dramatically
since the early 1990’s, particularly for non-emergent conditions treatable in other set-
tings. The rise in ED demand is not inherently problematic–when demand increases
for iPads, we do not intervene. However, one symptom of this increase has been a
3.5% annual compound growth in wait times (see Figure 1). This is an important
problem with substantial welfare consequences both in lost health and time1. Sugges-
tively, patients in 2009 collectively spent 7.06 billion minutes (13.4 millennia) waiting
to be seen by an ED clinician (Becker and Friedman 2014).
As such, there have been many explanations of increased crowding put forth. All, how-
ever, focus on increased demand as the driver of crowding. For instance, researchers
have pointed to the decline of primary care in driving more patients to EDs, increased
uninsurance (Miller 2011, DeNavas-Walt et al. 2012), and defensive medicine as ex-
Median Wait Time To See An Emergency Department (ED) Physician, Selected Years
Minutes
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Modiﬁed from Wilper AP, Woolhandler S, Lasser KE, et al. Waits to see an emergency department 
physician: US trends and predictors, 1997-2004. Health Aﬀ (Millwood). 2008;27:w84-95.
Figure 1: Growth in wait times, 1997-2009
1See Section A.4 for an enumeration of these costs.
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planations. These explanations are unsatisfactory, however, in that none explain why
capacity has not increased to meet increased demand for ED services–returning to
the iPad example, both Apple and other competitors raced to expand production
of tablets when they proved popular, eliminating temporary shortages. The central
question of this thesis, then, is why increased wait times have persisted in response
to a shift in long-term demand for ED care.
The persistence of this phenomenon suggests that maintenance of high wait times
may be profit-maximizing2. Like all questions of profit, the incentive to improve
wait times hangs on the balance of how much doing so changes revenues relative
to costs. For instance, it could be that it is simply very expensive to maintain the
capacity required to handle peak loads, and that wait times serve as the overflow when
unpredictable surges in patient flow occur. However, the temporal patterns of patient
demand are eminently predictable (Pitts et al. [2012]), which mitigates this concern.
Moreover, solutions to efficiently improve thoroughput exist (bed management, fast-
track, instant labs, consult priority, and others – Hoot and Aronsky [2008]), yet
the problem persists. Furthermore, other firms–namely urgent care clinics, retail
clinics, and primary care clinics–profit from seeing the less severely injured patients
on an unscheduled basis at 1
3
to 1
5
the price . Thus for it to be an issue of cost,
it has to be an issue of scope–whether it is substantially less expensive to treat
patients in firms that handle only less severe cases versus firms that handle the full
spectrum of time-sensitive severities. While this is certainly possible, EDs in aﬄuent
suburbs tend to advertise their low wait times, despite their broad scope, suggesting
that they find it profitable to see them. Resource input studies also show costs of
delivering uncomplicated care in emergency departments that are well below billed
2At least for for-profits, and likely for non-profits as well assuming that they are maximizing ED
profit in order to fund their altruistic goals (and that outpatient ED care is not amongst them).
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prices. Instead, I argue that the marginal patient does not bring in a price greater
than the opportunity cost of serving her, leaving hospitals with no incentive to reduce
wait times, and possibly even with an incentive to increase them. In other words,
quantity supplied (“ED capacity”) is endogenous to profitability.
I posit that supply has not expanded to meet demand because of a particular distor-
tion: firms are disallowed from turning away unprofitable patients, which has created
an incentive to reduce quality in ways that differentially reduce demand by unprof-
itable patients. Wait times provide hospitals that have many uninsured outpatients
with just such a mechanism, through their ability to reduce outpatient emergency
department demand without substantially affecting inpatient emergency department
demand.
I will frame the discussion and estimation strategy as follows. Section 1.1.1 describes
how emergency department visits exist on a spectrum of ex ante severity in patient
disease, proxied for by triage scores. Section 1.1.2 then conceptualizes two types
of crowding which differentially affect two parts of this spectrum: crowding which
impacts high-severity patients, and those that primarily impact low-severity patients.
Section 1.1.3 reviews the mechanisms by which hospitals can control their wait times.
Section 1.1.4 then posits that unprofitable patients are those who are uninsured and
low income, but not admitted to the hospital; by contrast, low income inpatients
are frequently profitable for reasons elaborated in that section. This correspondence
between different profitabilities and differing types of crowding, combined with the
mechanisms to control wait times and the incentive to do so, means that hospitals
may be able to discourage unprofitable patients from visiting their ED without much
impact on profitable patients. Sections 1.1.4.2 and 1.2 model this effect.
3
1.1.1. Unscheduled care as a spectrum of severity
Many commenters on either the increased rates of ED crowding or increasing health-
care costs have viewed the ED as an inappropriate place for care that can be pro-
vided in a primary care clinic. Market participants seem to maintain similar views;
for instance, insurers have increased copays on ED care, and occasionally even at-
tempted utilization review on the appropriateness of ED visits (Kellermann and
Weinick [2012]). Viewed in a market framework, however, the idea of ’inappropri-
ate’ care is less straightforward: individuals are simply responding to the incentives
they are given. Rather than emphasizing the time-sensitive nature of emergency de-
partment care provisioning, then, this thesis will consider the unscheduled nature of
such care. In this view, the appropriate/inappropriate dichotomy is replaced with a
spectrum of ex ante3 severity which relates to the likely ability of different clinics to
treat the patient.
Unscheduled care can be delivered in emergency departments, traditional primary
care clinics (PCCs), or new entrants such as urgent care clinics (UCCs) and retail
clinics (RCs). Traditionally, a patient with an uncomplicated fracture or similar need
would see their regular primary care physician. Such access to acute primary care is
increasingly rare (Group [1994]). Yet a return to the traditional model in which low- or
moderate-severity time-sensitive care needs are seen by primary care physicians seems
unlikely. The forces driving the decline of primary care, from physician preference for
predictable schedules to low reimbursement rates for cognitive work4 to integration
3I.e. at the moment the patient decides which provider to seek care or first arrives at the clinic
(including triage in EDs), not the severity as assessed after the clinician has exerted diagnostic effort
with an eye towards treatment, such as obtaining lab values or a detailed clinical history.
4Which according to the target income hypothesis increases the density of patient appointments
in a physician’s day, contrary to basic economic theory though the hypothesis may be. Instead,
income effects are a more promising explanation.
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of providers into ever-larger corporations, simply will not allow it.
Into this void have stepped a variety of new entrants: retail clinics (RCs), urgent care
clinics (UCCs), and even free-standing emergency departments5 (FEDs). Because
urgent care clinics handle a variety of acuities (unlike retail clinics), making them
competitors with EDs for the markets which they cover, and because they are quite
numerous (unlike free-standing emergency departments) and growing rapidly (8.6%
annual compound growth; see Section 1.3.0.2 for a detailed description of what is
known about UCCs), I will utilize UCC entry as a disruption in the market for
unscheduled care in order to observe emergency departments’ responses.
These entrants promise faster access times and a customer service-oriented model
(Mehrotra et al. 2009, Wang et al. 2010, Weinick et al. 2010), which may help improve
the delivery of both acute and non-acute (yet unscheduled) care. They also decrease
the travel costs of accessing care (Figure 19). In addition, emergency departments
are essentially local monopolies or oligopolies, and breaking that market power could
not only provide more choice to patients seeking unscheduled care but also force EDs
to compete in welfare-improving ways, such as by reducing wait times.
At the same time, these disruptive innovators are almost uniformly for-profit entities
with a corporate structure (in contrast to hospitals, which are largely non-profit, and
PCPs, who tend to be in for-profit small group practice). To the extent that their cor-
porate structure frees them to rethink traditional practices, and their for-profit status
excludes patient welfare from their objective functions6, these new entrants could un-
observably reduce quality. Furthermore, as freestanding entities, these entrants could
5FEDs exist in only a few states, most notably Texas.
6And, of course, this degree is highly debatable, given evidence that non-profits do not act
differently than for-profitsDuggan [2002] and that physicians still retain a large degree of power and
professional obligation despite being corporate employees.
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undermine the emphasis on care coordination in the PPACA 7.
Whether the negative or positive impact of urgent care entry on emergency depart-
ments predominates is an open question and, ultimately, an empirical one–and one to
which this thesis will bring data. To understand how urgent care entry impacts ED
crowding, however, we must understand how ED crowding affects different customers
(Section 1.1.2), how hospitals can control their wait times (Section 1.1.3), and how
the interaction of those two factors provides hospitals with a disincentive to reduce
wait times (Section 1.1.4).
1.1.2. Different types of crowding impact different parts of the spectrum of unsched-
uled care
I argue that emergency department crowding is not a single phenomenon, but at least
two. For instance, there seems to be a type of crowding that affects only patients
who are admitted, as when patients are ’boarded’ waiting for an inpatient bed to be
made available. Because patients with a high ex ante severity (as measured by the
triage score) are much more likely to be admitted–“emergent” patients are 6.7 times
more likely to be boarded than “semi-urgent” ones–this high-type crowding primarily
affects more severe cases8 (see Table 18).
Similarly, there seems to be a separate type of crowding (measured through wait
times) which primarily affects those with low ex ante probability of admission, as those
given high priority at triage wait substantially less than those deemed non-urgent (see
Figure 16). Median wait time for “immediate” triage is 20 minutes, compared to 37
and 35 minutes for “semi-urgent” and “urgent,” respectively9.
7Although skepticism as to the true value of such coordination is prudent.
8Author’s calculations, NHAMCS.
9Author’s calculations, NHAMCS.
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Table 1.1.2 classifies common crowding metrics by their impact on patients of different
levels of ex ante severity.
ED crowding metric Primarily affects
which ex ante
severity?
Mode of
arrival
Wait timea Low Walk-in
Left without being seenb Low Walk-in
Occupancy ratioc All Ambulanced
/ Walk-in
Boardinge High Ambulanced
/ Walk-in
Ambulance diversionf High Ambulance
Table 1.1.2: The relationship between acuities and ED crowding metrics
aThe time for patients of each acuity level to be seen by a clinician.
bThe proportion of patients leaving without being seen by a clinician.
cThe ratio of number of patients in ED to number of staffed beds.
dThe mechanism here is through an increase in the probability of diversion.
eThe practice of holding patients in ED beds after the decision to admit has been
made, generally because an inpatient bed is not available for an ED admission at that
time.
fThe practice of notifying an area’s emergency medical system that ambulances are
to be directed to other hospitals, generally triggered by hospital-specific criteria based on
boarding or wait times. Diversion is disallowed in some states.
This decoupling of wait times for the more- and less-severe ex ante patients is an ap-
propriate and necessary function of the triage system. However, it also gives hospitals
the ability to selectively discourage only patients not likely to result in admission. An
ED might have hours-long waits for patients with conditions as severe as fractures,
while a patient with chest pain and difficulty breathing might face no wait at all. Fig-
7
0100
200
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
boarded_pct
w
a
itt
im
e
Hospital−level NHAMCS
Figure 2: Hospital-level median wait time vs. percent boarded
ures 2 and 15 shows just that: the relationship between ED wait time and boarding
is extremely weak10.
If hospitals have control over these different aspects of wait times–if they are not
merely subject to them but can control them through investment in reducing them
via fixed- or variable-cost expenditures such as physical plant investment, staffing, and
predicting and intervening during periods of high demand–and if patients subject to
these two types of crowding are differentially profitable, they could use these two
different types of crowding to selectively filter unprofitable patients. In support of
this assumption, Pitts et al. [2014] find no association between ED boarding and
uninsurance or Medicaid rates, but I find that hospital emergency departments with
higher uninsurance rates (but not Medicaid) have longer wait times (Section 3.2.1).
Section 1.2 formalizes this argument.
10Figure 15 further investigates this relationship.
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1.1.3. Hospitals can control their wait times (and potentially do so independently of
other aspects of care)
Despite considerable attention having been paid to reducing ED wait times, they
have only increased. In the past, the medical literature has spoken as though this is a
result of “ED capacity,” (Hoot and Aronsky [2008]) but in fact ED capacity is simply
a function of fixed (facilities) and variable (labor, supplies) costs. Thus capacity rests
firmly within the hospital’s control.
This then provides an alternative lens through which to view Figure 2: the under-
lying incentives to improve wait times versus boarding may be different for different
hospitals. The claim that hospitals are ’choosing’ their wait times and boarding levels
deserves scrutiny. This section will briefly explore hospitals’ ability to control their
wait times at a reasonable cost, where ’reasonable’ here means a cost sufficiently low
to make it profitable to reduce wait times substantially were all patients paying the
average private insurer rate.
There are challenges to improving wait times for hospitals. Temporally, crowding is
not a continuous phenomenon, complicating efforts to match variable-cost resources
such as staff time with patient flows and driving up average expense (since fixed cost
resources such as physical space must be sized for maximum rather than average
capacity). However, the ED census tends to be highly time-dependent (Flottemesch
et al. [2007], Pitts et al. [2012]), making staffing needs relatively predictable.
A second challenge is the complex nature of the hospital organization in which emer-
gency departments operate. The health services research and operations management
literatures have posited that ED crowding is frequently the result of a lack of availabil-
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ity of inpatient beds for ED admissions11 (Derlet and Richards [2000]). ED crowding
can thus be conceptualized as a hospital-wide flow problem12. Consequently, naive
solutions to crowding such as increasing ED size are generally ineffective (Han et al.
[2007]).
Despite these challenges, it is technically feasible to improve wait times, and hos-
pitals can easily access information on doing so, both through consultants and the
academic literature. Many of these process improvements require expenditure of
effort and resources to conceive and implement initially, but little or no subsequent
expenditure. For instance, New York Presbyterian Hospital implemented a number of
initiatives over a six-year period such as reallocating staff hours, providing feedback to
staff about performance, and improved coordination with inpatient admitting teams
(Green [2007]). There was a concomitant decline in crowding metrics: 13% fewer left
without being seen, and an approximately 90% decline in diversion hours.
Other solutions to improve wait times include better inpatient bed management, ’fast
track’ programs which divert low-priority patients to a dedicated mid-level provider,
priority laboratory results, and priority consultations with specialty services.
In summary, various solutions to crowding exist (Hoot and Aronsky [2008]), but their
adoption remains low (Rabin et al. [2012]). A lack of incentive for hospitals to reduce
ED wait times might explain this phenomenon. Section 1.1.4 will examine those
incentives and compare them to the incentives to reduce boarding.
11Note that this is complexity which proves the point, as it is under hospital control.
12Jesse Pines, personal correspondence
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1.1.4. Hospital disincentives to improve wait times
1.1.4.1 More acute patients are more likely to be profitable
The Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) pro-
hibits hospitals from simply turning patients away13. We might expect, therefore,
that hospitals seek an alternative mechanism by which to discourage unprofitable
patients from seeking care.
The view that uninsured patients are unprofitable is likely too simplistic. Instead, it
is ED visits from the low-income uninsured and Medicaid patients that do not result
in admission which are most likely to be unprofitable after variable costs, opportunity
costs, and the marginal fixed cost related to increased capacity to routinely treat such
patients is taken into account. In 2001, EDs received a mean of $1,104 for a visit
from a privately-insured or Medicare patient, $508 for a Medicaid visit, and $792 for
a visit by the uninsured14. Assuming that the marginal cost of treatment is related
primarily to clinical factors rather than insurance status, this implies that there is
some cost and visit proportion of uninsured and Medicaid outpatients above which
outpatient ED care is profit-reducing. Wilson and Cutler [2014] find that across
both inpatient and outpatient care, hospital profit margins for the privately-insured
are positive (39.6%) and margins for Medicare (-15.6%), Medicaid (approximately
-35%), and the uninsured (-54.4%) were negative.
Inpatient care is less likely to be affected by such concerns. First, because of di-
13An explanation which is traditional, but not quite satisfactory, given that most ED crowding
is driven by non-life-threatening conditions which EMTALA does not cover. Indeed, at least one
major for-profit hospital chain (HCA) has begun aggressively turning away patients who are not in
immediate risk of death. For a legal analysis of EMTALA, see Bitterman [1992].
14Source: 2011 MEPS ED file, author’s calculations using appropriate survey weights. See Ap-
pendix, Section A.6 for details.
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minished access to primary care and perhaps also due to hospital discretion over
admission decisions, uninsured and Medicaid patients likely comprise a much smaller
proportion of inpatient stays than they do outpatient stays, even amongst inpatients
admitted from the ED. Second, the disparity between revenues from the uninsured
and those with private insurance is smaller for inpatient vs. outpatient care (Ho et al.
[0], page 14). Third, hospitals have been forced to expand the number of ED beds,
whereas they have been contracting the number of inpatient beds (Resources [2008]).
Thus if much of the cost of a hospital-based visit of either type is fixed cost, fixed ED
costs act more like marginal costs if they increase the probability of having to invest
in further capacity expansion, whereas the opposite is true for inpatient stays.
Wilson and Cutler [2014] provide evidence in support of these conclusions:
ED discharges were markedly less profitable than admissions for pa-
tients with Medicaid and private insurance. For Medicare visits, the profit
margin for ED discharges was -53.6 percent, compared to an admission
profit margin of 18.4 percent. For patients with private insurance, ED dis-
charges were profitable, but less so than hospital admissions. For patients
with Medicaid and the uninsured, both ED discharges and admissions
were associated with negative profits.
Thus hospitals may attempt to discourage uninsured patients with a low probability
of admission from seeking ED care. When combined with the concept of different
types of crowding impacting different markets elaborated in Section 1.1.2, it becomes
clear that wait times may provide hospitals with just such a mechanism. Indeed,
uninsured and lower-income patients face greater wait times, as Figure 20 documents
for individual-level effects and Figure 9 for hospital-level effects, with the latter ex-
pected to be larger due to factors such as practice style-changes, hospital-wide policy
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changes, and a strong aversion to differential treatment of patients within a single ED
by both patients and providers. Section 1.1.4.2 provides a graphical model of hospi-
tal incentives to filter the uninsured, and Section 1.2 more formally models hospital
profits as a function of wait time filtering of the uninsured with a low probability of
admission.
1.1.4.2 EMTALA as a price ceiling
Consider Figure 3. D2 is the total demand for emergency department services from
insured customers. Quantity is greater because they are presumed to be more nu-
merous. For simplicity, I assume that the price is the out-of-pocket price, abstracting
away the moral hazard effect of insurance. D1 is the demand of the uninsured. It
is kinked because at prices above p¯, a proportion of the customers will find it more
advantageous to declare bankruptcy or seek to have the debt written off rather than
pay15. Thus EMTALA induces what acts somewhat like a price ceiling, in that any
price above p¯ is not paid by these patients. This mandated distortion has the usual
effect of price ceilings: quantity demanded is greater than quantity supplied. In this
case, there is too little investment in ED capacity (fixed cost) and staffing (variable
cost), resulting in high waits.
There is, however, an additional distortion which this ceiling might introduce. Sup-
pose p¯ actually represents a price at which emergency departments lose money sup-
plying care (MC > MR). Then q1 is below zero. Were uninsured patients the
only patients in the market, EDs would simply shut down or rely on more altruistic
motives. However, they might still choose to operate if the profits from serving the
insured patients made up for the gap. In this environment, however, hospitals have
15This is obviously an abstraction of the “true” situation, in which different individuals are likely
to have different cutoffs, and therefore the curvature would be continuous rather than sharply kinked.
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a strong motive to attempt to dissuade the uninsured from visiting. One potentially
potent way to do so might be through increasing wait times above what the ’natural’
capacity constraints imposed by the price ceiling demand.
Section 1.2 spins this intuition into a more fully fleshed-out model. In the model, it
is not necessary that elasticity of demand of the uninsured with respect to wait times
be higher than the insured. Rather the hospital considers its total proportion of unin-
sured patients, and uses wait times to discourage outpatient emergency department
demand when the net outpatient emergency department case mix is unprofitable.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Having provided an informal ar-
gument that ED wait times are endogenous to hospital profitability and that one
consequence of this endogeneity is that hospitals may use wait times to filter unprof-
itable patients, Section 1.2 provides a formal model.
Section 1.3 gives background and institutional details about the unscheduled care
market. Section 1.4 reviews the previous economic work on quality, hospital objec-
tive functions, economies of scope, and the miscellaneous economic forays into the
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unscheduled care market to date.
Section 1.5 continues the arguments begun here and points to the areas of the thesis
where each is elaborated and tested.
1.2. Modeling the competitive response of EDs
This section models emergency department response to increased low-reimbursement
case mix, assuming that those with higher ex ante severity (and thus higher probabil-
ity of admission, and thus who are less impacted by wait times) are more profitable
even if they are uninsured or on Medicaid (see Section 1.1.4.1 for justification). Ap-
pendix A.7 lists the variable definitions in a convenient format.
In order for a profitable case mix to cause higher wait times, the model must produce
the following prediction:
∂w∗
∂α
> 0 (1.1)
Where w∗ is the optimized wait time and α is the proportion of uninsured in the
market. In other words, hospitals find it profitable to increase wait times as the
proportion of uninsured increases.
Assume there are two types of patients along each of two dimensions, denoted by
s = 0 for those less sick, s = 1 for those more sick, i = 0 for uninsured/Medicaid, and
i = 1 for privately insured/Medicare patients. According to the motivation for this
model, s = 0, i = 0 patients are assumed to cost more to serve than they deliver in
revenue to the hospital (e.g. they are unprofitable).
We formalize the assumption that the profitability of unprofitable ED outpatients is
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increasing in waittime, but decreasing in waittime for profitable ED outpatients as,
∂Πs=0,i=0
∂w
> 0 >
∂Πs 6=0,i 6=0
∂w
and∣∣∣∂Πs=0,i=0∂w ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂Πs 6=0,i 6=0∂w ∣∣∣.
We posit that for a given insurance rate, the profit-wait time relationship is inverted
and approximately U-shaped:
Proﬁt
Wait
w*
More generally, we require that ∂2Π
∂w2
< 0.
This, in combination with the earlier assertion that ∂w∗
∂α
> 0, the single-crossing
theorem implies ∂2Π
∂w∂α
> 0.
In all of the following, we assume that ∂market size
∂w
= 0. This is a strong and likely
unrealistic assumption.
1.2.1. Per-patient profit
Let Π(s, i) denote the profit to the hospital for a patient of type (s, i).
By assumption, uninsured low-severity/outpatient customers are unprofitable, Π(s =
0, i = 0) = pis=1,i=0 < 0 .
The insured are given constants for these per-patient profitabilities:
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Π(s = 1, i = 1) = pis=1,i=1
Π(s = 0, i = 1) = pis=0,i=1
Where pis=1,i=1 > pis=0,i=1
?
> pis=1,i=0.
The uninsured high-severity cases are given a distribution of profitabilities which
relates to their probability of admission:
Π(s = 1, i = 0) = ρpiprf + (1− ρ)picharity > 0
Where piprf is the profit when an uninsured patient is admitted and turns out to
be profitable, and picharity is when the hospital cannot recoup the cost. ρ is the
Pr(prf |i = 0, s = 1).
This profitability Π(s = 1, i = 0) is positive but small (presumably smaller than
pis=1,i=1), although the model conclusions do not depend on it being so.
Define σ1 = Pr(s = 1|i = 1, x = 1) and let ∂σ1∂w > 0, where x = 1 if the patient seeks
ED care and x = 0 if they instead utilize their outside option.
Then 1− σ1 = Pr(s = 0|i = 1, x = 1).
Similarly,σ0 = Pr(s = 1|i = 0, x = 1) and ∂σ0∂w > 0.
Further assume that ∂σ0
∂w
< ∂σ1
∂w
if insured patients have a better outside option or
higher valuation of time relative to other costs.
1.2.2. Total profit
Total profit is then:
Π(w) = (1− α)
σ1 (w) >0,high︷ ︸︸ ︷pis=1,i=1 + (1− σ1 (w)) >0,medium/small︷ ︸︸ ︷pis=0,i=1

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+α
σ0 (w) >0,small/medium︷ ︸︸ ︷pis=1,i=0 + (1− σ0 (w)) <0︷ ︸︸ ︷pis=0,i=0

Differentiating with respect to w gives us:
∂Π
∂w
= (1− α)
[
σ
′
1
(w) pis=1,i=1 − σ ′1 (w) pis=0,i=1
]
+α
[
σ
′
0
(w) pis=1,i=0 − σ ′0 (w) pis=0,i=0
]
Further differentiating with respect to α yields:
∂2Π
∂α∂w
= −
[
σ
′
1
(w) pis=1,i=1 − σ ′1 (w) pis=0,i=1
]
+
[
σ
′
0
(w)pis=1,i=0 − σ ′0 (w) pis=0,i=0
]
=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ
′
1
(w)
 <0︷ ︸︸ ︷pis=0,i=1 − pis=1,i=1

+σ
′
0
(w)
[
pis=1,i=0 −
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
pis=0,i=0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
=⇒ a sufficient condition for ∂2Π
∂α∂w
> 0 =⇒ ∂w∗
∂α
> 0 is
σ
′
0
(w) [pis=1,i=0 − pis=0,i=0] > σ ′1(w) [pis=1,i=1 − pis=0,i=1]
Since σ
′
1
(w) > σ
′
0
(w), sufficient conditions under which the hypothesized effect occurs
are:
1. That hospitals experience a sufficiently large loss on (s = 0, i = 0) types, OR
2. That there is a sufficiently high probability of (s = 1, i = 0) types being prof-
itable, OR
3. That there is a sufficiently small difference in profitability between (s = 1, i = 1)
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and (s = 0, i = 1) types.
This model makes the argument of wait time filtering formal, and helps us understand
the dynamics of wait time-based screening and its interaction with area factors such
as the percent uninsured in a county or HRR/HSA.
1.2.3. The mechanical effect of volume
Because many of the sources of exogenous variation in emergency department unin-
surance visitation rates involve changes in the total volume of patients visiting the
hospital, a discussion of the impact of volumes on wait times is warranted. In the
short term, increased average volumes should unambiguously increase wait times. In
the long run, as hospitals have time to adjust relatively fixed resources (e.g. building
more facilities, hiring more staff, investing in better flow management), wait times
should weakly increase relative to the baseline (i.e. be equal or greater to the wait
times observed immediately before the patient volume increase). Compared to the
short-term elevation they should weakly decrease. The rate of adjustment will be de-
termined by the cost of adjusting, the profitability of the case mix, and the elasticity
of demand of different patient types with respect to wait times.
1.3. Study setting and institutional details
Americans seek acute care 354 million times per year (Pitts et al. [2010]). The clas-
sic model of acute care–in which patients either call their regular PCP for urgent
care needs not requiring a hospital, or go to the emergency department (ED) for ur-
gent problems which do–is seen as having “broken down” compared to the (possibly
mythical) ideal of the past (on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States
Health System [2007]). Indeed, only 42% of all acute care visits in 2010 involved
the patient’s primary physician, compared to 28% seen in emergency departments
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and 20% seen by specialists (Pitts et al. [2010]). As early as 1994, 16% of Medicaid
patients were told to call 911 or transport themselves to the ED when they called
their PCP about an urgent health need (Group 1994), and the number is thought
to be substantially higher now. One mechanism for increased PCP referrals to EDs
may have been the decline of after-hours care, with nearly 90% of Western European
PCPs providing care outside of normal business hours but only 40% of American
PCPs doing so (Schoen et al. [2006])16.
At the same time, acute and even routine primary care which would have have rarely
been seen in the ED has become common in that setting, with 28% of all acute care
visits now seen in the ED versus only 45% in primary care outpatient offices (Pitts
et al. [2010])17. This parallel trend has been driven by the combination of the rise of
the uninsured (DeNavas-Walt et al. [2012]) and the unintended consequences of the
Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)’s mandate
that EDs stabilize patients regardless of their ability to pay. Crowding, and ensuing
increases in wait times, have increased since then, although no data is available to
assess whether the law coincided with accelerating problems.
1.3.0.1 Crowding and its impact on ED profitability
A recent study has taken the perspective that crowding is endogenous to profitability,
and used hospital data to determine whether hospitals see increased revenues as a re-
sult of maintaining crowded EDs relative to their revenues if they maintained the level
of (un)crowding that clinicians, patients, and commentators might prescribe (Pines
et al. [2011]). The study examines the relationship between boarding (see Section
16No citation specifically showing the trend could be found, but anecdotally there has been a
sharp decline.
17Again, the available data is cross-sectional due to data limitations in early years, but there is
considerable anecdotal support for a trend.
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1.1.2) and revenues at a single ED using medical record and billings data. It builds
a counterfactual using simulated diversion strategies, under which hospitals might
improve revenues by reducing boarding selectively. While the study is promising for
casting a critical eye towards hospitals as passive observers of ED crowding and for its
thorough modeling using detailed microdata, its emphasis is on a different domain.
This thesis addresses ED profitability from a perspective which differs in important
ways.
First, Pines et al. focus on boarding, which largely affects higher-acuity patients (see
Table 1.1.2), for whom sanctions from EMTALA and the court of public opinion are
most severe. Furthermore, their hospital stays are more likely are profitable than
the outpatient visits of the same patients, as many of the uninsured can be signed
up for Medicaid while inpatients. Finally, their demand is likely relatively inelastic
with respect to crowding due to the importance of receiving medical care, potentially
diminished opportunity costs given that they would likely not be working or engaging
in leisure activities anyway18, and the timing of the delay (due to behavioral issues
surrounding the sunk cost fallacy, as boarding happens after the patient has already
seen the clinician). The effects of using ED crowding as a filter (as modeled in Section
1.2) to improve profitability may instead be greatest for those seeking time-sensitive
primary care and, to a lesser but still substantial degree, those seeking care for urgent
health needs (fractures, etc.).
Second, Pines et al. take a simulated counterfactual of a single ED, and look only at
revenues. The finding that decreased boarding can increase revenue assumes adopting
an optimal strategy. This is equivalent to studying a single firm at the production
possibilities frontier–many other firms in the market may not be able to achieve such
18On the other hand, they might be more sensitive to the discomfort of waiting in the hospital
relative to waiting at home.
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results. Indeed, in the two years since the study, the investigated ED did not even
adopt the recommended intervention to improve revenues, suggesting either ineffi-
ciency or some other overriding constraint not modeled in the study. It is therefore
desirable to examine actual firm behavior across many firms. This thesis utilizes data
from all hospitals in two states to do so.
1.3.0.2 Urgent care clinics
Clinics calling themselves “urgent care” have existed for decades, but interviews in the
lay press indicate that there seems to have been a substantive shift in the number and
retail orientation of these clinics in the mid-2000’s. For our purposes, it is important
to note that urgent care clinics offer little or no unreimbursed care, as they are not
subject to EMTALA if they are not operating on the campus a hospital. These clinics
also emphasize customer service and speed as a key aspect of their business model.
Acute unscheduled medical care can be delivered in a number of clinical settings.
While historically the purview of the primary care office, acute unscheduled care is
increasingly delivered in other settings–most frequently the emergency department
(Pitts et al. [2010]) but also retail clinics (Mehrotra and Lave [2012]) and urgent
care clinics (Weinick et al. [2009b]). This move towards alternative settings for acute
care delivery is in part driven by the declining availability of conventional primary
care offices (Asplin BR [2005]), but also as a result of patient preference for cost-
transparent and convenient patient-centered solutions that do not require advanced
planning.
Retail clinics are different in business model and clinical capabilities compared to
urgent care clinics: Retail clinics treat a strictly limited set of conditions, are owned
by the pharmacies they locate inside, and serve as “loss leaders” to increase pharmacy
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sales, whereas urgent care clinics treat more severe (but still limited) conditions re-
quiring diagnostics and interventions, are located in a variety of settings, and must
be independently profitable to remain in business. Nevertheless, similarities abound:
they both utilize nurse practitioners and physician assistants extensively, emphasize
rapid walk-in care, are relatively new, and tend to locate in retail (as opposed to
medical) settings.
What little is known about urgent care clinics comes primarily from a survey con-
ducted in 2008. Several of the findings of this survey relate to market structure
(Weinick et al. [2009a,b]). 33.7% of UCCs had been open fewer than 5 years, which
implies an annually-compounded growth rate of 8.6%19. 28.6% were hospital-owned
or -affiliated. 17.5% were chains. The remaining 54.3% were independent, physician-
owned practices. Payment sources of UCC are compared to primary care clinics
(PCCs) and EDs in Figure 4, and reinforce the general impression that UCCs lie
somewhere between PCCs and EDs.
Other relevant findings of this survey include that there were between 8,000 and
10,000 urgent care clinics in the country, that the typical collection from insurance
was $109, similar to that of a primary care clinic (and about 1
3
− 1
5
the price of an
uncomplicated emergency department visit at the time.
1.4. Previous literature
This analysis has the potential to address theoretical questions in several economic
literatures. The question of whether firms utilize high wait times to reduce volume
among certain patient types is the inverse of the typical quality competition story, the
literature for which is reviewed in Section 1.4.1. Because the questions throughout
19Obtained by solving for 1(1+x)5 = 1−0.337, which makes the assumption that the growth process
is neither accellerating nor decelerating.
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Figure 4: Urgent care payment sources
this thesis all touch directly or indirectly on economies of scope, that literature is
reviewed here as well. Finally, this analysis touches on longstanding questions related
to what firms of different ownership types optimize–a question associated with two
substantial bodies of literature, the behavior of non-profits (reviewed in Section 1.4.4)
and the behavior of physicians (reviewed in Section 1.4.5).
1.4.1. Literature on quality competition
Interest in modeling quality competition dates back at least as far as Chamberlain
[1931], Abbott [1953], and Dorfman and Steiner [1954]. The latter of these models
is the most formalized, most general, and most focused on quality. Dorfman and
Steiner’s model considers quality to be a product attribute that increases both demand
and unit cost, and primarily focus on the firm’s decision under certainty.
Spence [1975], in keeping with the times, considers the informational problem that
results from market failure. Specifically, they find that product characteristics under
monopoly or monopolistic competition will differ from the social optimum because the
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firm chooses to increase quality if the benefit to the marginal consumer exceeds the
cost of increasing quality, whereas the inframarginal consumers’ potential valuation
from increased costs are not taken into account. Swan [1970], by contrast, shows that
market structure has no effect on quality. Schmalensee [1979] surveys the literature
and finds that the effect of increased competition on quality is generally ambiguous:
on the one hand increased competition brings lower margins per-product, on the other,
firms now must compete harder for customers and quality is a potential mechanism
to do so. He concludes that, “There is an obvious need for empirical work to confront
the implications of the theoretical literature with data.” 35 years later, there are still
relatively few articles doing just that–testament to the difficulty of studying quality.
More recent models have considered quantity-quality competition as a two-stage
game, but find similarly ambiguous predictions depending on the particulars of the
game’s timing. Motta (Motta [1993]) sets up the game with duopolistic firms choosing
quality simultaneously in first stage. The second stage is then Cournot or Bertrand
(both situations are analyzed). Motta also considers both what Dorfman and Steiner
would deem ’advertising’–where a fixed expenditure results in increased demand–and
’quality’–where a per-unit expenditure results in increased demand. Motta finds that
in all models, firms choose distinct quantities at equilibrium. He finds that price
competition produces more differentiation in quality than quantity competition un-
der both cost structures. Partly as a result, he finds higher welfare under price than
quality competition.
Aoki (1994), by contrast, has firms choose quality sequentially in first stage, resulting
in a split quality choice (the first-mover chooses higher quality; the responding firm
lower). In a later paper, Aoki and Prusa [1997] examine the implications of this
difference: for at least the model studied, simultaneous choice yields higher quality
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and welfare than sequential choice.
Chaudhuri [2000] has firms choose sequentially in both stages, with the higher-quality
firm moving first. He finds that quality strictly declines relative to the models of both
Aoki and Motta.
Chioveanu [2010] has firms choose price and quality simultaneously in an oligopolistic
setting, with heterogeneous consumer preferences for price and quality, then considers
the impact of governmental intervention. She finds that, while minimum quality
regulation improves quality in this model, welfare reduction results. This finding of
increased quality from regulation adds to the general literature on the topic, with
similar findings (reviewed in Krishna [1989])–even when what is regulated is not
quality directly but quantity, when the firms facing quantity restrictions are of lower
quality (typically the setting these authors had in mind was American automobile
tarrifs), quality improves. One exception is Chaudhuri’s model, which under its
relatively narrow assumptions finds quantity regulation harming quality.
To the best of my knowledge, no paper models regulation of price and predicts the
effect on quality. This is the closest analogue to the situation documented in this
thesis, and might well prove the exception to the general trend of regulation acting
to improve quality in two-stage games.
Furthermore, there may be more than one type of quality. In the healthcare market,
demand tends to respond more to perceived quality–which in turn hinges on easily-
observable factors such as clinician likeability and facility amenities–than to clinical
factors such as adherence to clinical guidelines or surgical morbidity and mortality.
Predictions about how firms shift between the two types of quality depend on the cost
of investment in each and the elasticity of demand with respect to each. However,
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given reasonable assumptions about both, it is not much of a stretch to say that in
the face of increased competition, unobservable quality will weakly decrease and that
the effect on observable quality is ambiguous.
Dranove and Satterthwaite model a related problem relevant to a time when greater
price transparency was being considered (Dranove and Satterthwaite [1992]). To
answer that question, they model a Bayesian consumer for whom price and quality
are both imperfectly observable. Given an increase in price transparency, they find
conditions under which quality supplied might decline, even though its observability
was not exogenously altered. This model supports the stylized assertion above that
the affect of competition on imperfectly-observed quality is ambiguous.
While individual models make strong predictions about change in quality as a result of
increased competition, changing relatively small assumptions seems to reverse those
predictions. Thus it is difficult not to conclude that, despite the passage of more
than three decades, Schmalensee’s admonition to turn to the data holds. This thesis
will consider wait times as a proxy for observable quality, with Section 3.2 also using
ambulatory care-sensitive conditions as a measure of unobservable quality.
As we might expect given that the predictions of theoretical models are highly depen-
dent on the technical assumptions made, empirical results on the effects of quality
competition are inconsistent. The study of any particular industry thus hinges on
the particulars, but some generalizations can be made. In dozens of studies across
a wide variety of firms and industries, there is considerable heterogeneity in the link
between quality and profitability (Zeithaml [2000]). In a seminal paper, Matsa [2011]
develops a quantitative measure of quality (proportion of stock-outs in grocery stores)
and uses Walmart’s geographically contiguous expansion for identification. He finds
that increased competition yields increased quality.
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Investment in quality is typically expensive (Griliches [1971]), particularly for “highly-
customized, big-ticket service” industries (Rust et al. [1995]) such as healthcare. For
investment in quality to be profitable, then, it must result in an increase in revenue
weakly greater than the cost incurred. The revenue gain from higher quality can come
from attracting new customers or from improving retention rates (“repeat customers”)
(Rust et al. [1995]). In the literature on service industries, repeat customers are
assumed to be more valuable since selling costs are substantially lower (Peters [1988]).
It is unclear whether this assumption holds in the context of EDs, however, given the
distortion which EMTALA induces. The pejorative term “frequent fliers” suggests
that repeat customers to the ED may not, in fact, be profitable.
It is this very distortion which gives rise to the central prediction of this thesis:
hospitals will use wait times as a filter to screen unprofitable patients to the extent
possible. EDs in areas of high uninsurance and low income might thus be expected to
have high wait times, and those in areas of low uninsurance and high incomes should
have low wait times. Similarly, EDs in areas with many unprofitable patients will not
respond to increased competition by increasing patient-observable quality (reducing
wait times), whereas those in areas with profitable patients will respond aggressively.
Finally, we consider the question of the interaction of quality investment with the
non-profit objective functions discussed in Section 1.4.4. We can predict that for-
profit EDs minimize unobservable quality20, but we cannot sign their investment in
observable quality. By contrast, depending on the objectives of non-profit EDs, they
may or may not decrease investment in unobservable quality as competition increases.
In extreme cases, they may even increase investment in quality if they perceive that
20Although the change therein with increased competition could be zero if they are already
optimizing. Also note again that there are external constraints such as physician behavior on their
ability to minimize unobservable quality.
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a greater proportion of their regional market is being harmed by poor quality of the
new competition and they have area welfare in mind.
1.4.2. Existing work on the economics of the unscheduled care market
1.4.2.1 Emergency departments
Most of the existing work on the economics of the unscheduled care market has tried
to understand whether insurance increases or decreases emergency department uti-
lization. The theory that insurance should decrease ED utilization rests on two pillars.
The first is that uninsured patients do not pay the full cost of their care. EMTALA
acts as a binding constraint on hospitals, preventing them from turning patients
away, resulting in what might be termed involuntary charity care being delivered in
the emergency department. The second is that patients may prefer to receive pri-
mary care from a primary care provider (substitution), or that regular primary care
may prevent emergency visits. Miller [2011] compares ED visit trends in counties
experiencing large declines in uninsurance as a result of the Massachusetts insurance
expansion to those experiencing small declines, and finds that the expansion reduced
ED usage by 8%. The contrasting argument that insurance should increase ED uti-
lization is that moral hazard (Pauly [1968]) will increase all healthcare utilization. In
contrast with the quasi-experimental design of Miller’s study, Taubman et al. [2014]
exploit the Oregon Medicaid expansion lottery as an instrument and show that receipt
of insurance increased the probability of ED utilization by almost 40%.
1.4.2.2 Retail clinics
Parente and Town use claims data with individual fixed effects and a matched cohort
of non-retail clinic users to show that those who use retail clinics decrease their
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utilization in other settings without an apparent decrease in quality (Parente and
Town [2009]). Ashwood et al. [2011] find the opposite, however. Both papers focus on
retail clinic quality; neither is designed to address the question of quality competition
with other firm types in the unscheduled care market.
1.4.3. Economies of scale and scope
The classic model of economies of scope (Panzar and Willig [1981], Baumol et al.
[1988]) defined the ray economy of scale and focuses on the complementarities in cost
that result when a firm produces in more than one market. A substantial body of
literature exists examining the economies of scope in hospitals (e.g. Grannemann
et al. [1986], Fournier and Mitchell [1992]) and health insurers (e.g. Given [1996]).
The hospital-specific literature derives from the supply-side economy of scope litera-
ture, and thus has primarily utilized firm-specific cost information. Early work made
relatively strong assumptions about cost functions such as the trans-log, which more
recent work has relaxed.
In general, these studies examine whole-hospital scope in that they are not examining
whether the several different markets serviced by a single emergency department21
might be more efficiently delivered by several smaller firms instead (i.e. retail clin-
ics for non-severe unscheduled needs, primary care for moderate severity scheduled
needs, urgent care clinics for moderate severity unscheduled needs, and emergency
departments for severe unscheduled needs). For instance, Grannemann et al. [1986]
considered the number of emergency department visits and other outpatient depart-
ment visits using hospital cost data and data on the total number of visits to each
hospitals’ emergency department, and found substantial economies of scale for emer-
gency department care but not for other outpatient departments. They also found
21See Section 1.1.1 for a description of these markets as distinct along a spectrum of acuity.
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diseconomies of scope between emergency departments and inpatient care and no
economies or diseconomies of scope between EDs and other outpatient departments
(marginal cost of an ED visit was $121, $124, and $125 for high, middle, and low
volume outpatient departments at the same hospital). The estimate is difficult to
interpret, however. Since that study, emergency care has transformed into its own
specialty, with its own training and its own department at most hospitals. Further-
more, the relevant scope question is still likely within-ED rather than between ED
and other outpatient departments, although if the myth of the primary care provider
who squeezed in urgent cases with aplomb reflected reality then a substantial part of
a typical outpatient office might well be equivalent to today’s urgent care.
To properly assess economies of scope within the unscheduled care market, we would
need cost data on the outpatient narrow-scope competitors which collectively com-
prise a disaggregated emergency department, as well as emergency departments, plus
detailed clinical data to ensure that visit acuity was comparable. This, regrettably,
is not to be.
1.4.4. Non-profit and for-profit hospital behavior
Whereas the objective function of for-profit firms has long been relatively settled–
they maximize profit22–the question of what non-profit firms optimize remains less
clear. The key differentiator of a non-profit from a for-profit firm is that the non-
profit is unable to return its residual income to shareholders or owners, and must
either reinvest these “profits” back into the firm, invest them for future expenditures
(endowments) or spend them on a social mission or staff salaries.
Within this requirement there is broad scope for different behaviors. Consequently,
22Although controversy exists as to whether managers are able to exploit their position to also
maximize their own well-being, a principal-agent model.
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numerous theoretical models both contradictory and mutually compatible (reviewed
in Section 1.4.4) have been developed (Newhouse [1970], Pauly and Redisch [1973],
Norton and Staiger [1994], Hirth [1999] inter alios)23. Because the theoretical models
do not point in a clear direction, empirical study is necessary to determine which
of the various theoretical models most closely reflects common non-profit objective
functions (Duggan [2002]). This literature largely concerns itself with whether firms
seek to limit the proportion of low-reimbursement patients through various means,
and whether the effect differs by ownership status.
This empirical work has occurred in the context of non-profit hospitals (85% of hos-
pitals are non-profit institutions - Ginsburg [2003]). However, outpatient clinics and
small practices may have entirely different objective functions than large, corporate
entities. Indeed, the demand inducement literature (reviewed in Section 1.4.5) takes
as its baseline perfect patient agency, despite physician practices being typically or-
ganized as for-profit partnerships.
Little has been written about emergency departments per se. However, the majority
of ED closures and openings are due to closure or opening of an entire hospital (Hsia
et al. [2011]).
Empirical study is necessary to determine which of the various theoretical models
most closely reflects common non-profit objective functions (Duggan [2002]). Duggan
examines the behavior of non-profit, for-profit, and government hospitals after a lump-
sum transfer and finds no change in non-profit charitable behavior. By contrast,
Bayindir [2012] utilizes the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) to demonstrate that
for-profits are less likely to provide expensive procedures to the uninsured to a greater
23Hospitals were the primary example of non-profit firms in this literature, and health economics
led the development of the various theories of the non-profit Newhouse [1970], Pauly and Redisch
[1973].
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degree than non-profits.
Norton and Staiger [1994] find that location is a critical mediator of hospital behavior.
After instrumenting using (led and lagged) population characteristics as well as a
multinomial logit model predicting the probability of a hospital being of a given type,
they show that non-profits and for-profits see the same volume of uninsured patients
relative to the number of such patients in the area, but that for-profits are less likely
to be located in such areas.
Chakravarty et al. [2005] demonstrate one reason why: for-profits move away more
readily in response to adverse demand shocks. They demonstrate higher rates of entry
and exit for for-profit hospitals, and use an ordered probit model to show that these
differences are in response to changes in localized demand. Intriguingly, they find
that chain membership for for-profits decreases the probability of exit in response
to decreased demand, perhaps because the larger firm strategically covers the space
for entry deterrence. This is consistent with the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson
[2006], who allow both objectives and costs of capital to differ between firm types. A
central prediction of their model is that, because they have non-pecuniary objectives,
non-profits are more likely to remain in a market after it has become unprofitable even
accounting for their additional revenue (donations) and lower costs (tax breaks).
Having chosen a location, hospital profitability can be modified by more than just the
volume of charity care provided. For instance, Horwitz and Nichols [2009] find that
for-profits selectively cut unprofitable service lines. Given that psychiatric services
are prominent among these service lines (Horwitz [2005]), this may generate negative
externalities. Dafny finds that for-profits up-code towards highly reimbursing DRGs
to a greater degree than non-profits (Dafny [2005]). Urban non-profits are also more
likely to do so than rural non-profits (Horwitz and Nichols [2011]).
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The question of what non-profits optimize has far-reaching implications. A better
theory of non-profits–or simply knowing which of the existing theories best describes
non-profit behavior in which domains–would prove invaluable in predicting counter-
factuals following mergers or policy impacts such as Accountable Care Organization-
driven consolidation.
Beyond prediction, however, the theoretical implications are significant. Take the
example of “cost-shifting”–the theory that public insurance uses its market and fiat
power to under-pay for services, whereas private insurance is forced to over-pay as
a direct consequence (Morrisey [1996]). In order for cost shifting to occur, firms
must have market power (such that they are able to discriminate), and they must
not have already been using this market power to its fullest extent24 (Frakt [2011]).
This latter condition implies that cost-shifting is primarily a concern for hospitals
maximizing something other than pure profit. Friesner and Rosenman [2002] analyze
the situation of “prestige” (non-profits optimizing quantity subject to a bankruptcy
constraint Newhouse [1970]) and find that such a utility function could either lead
to cost-shifting or the exact opposite effect. Knowing the true extent of cost-shifting
would affect assessments of the welfare implications of public insurance, and would
alter prominent estimates of the impact of creating a public insurance plan to compete
with private plans (e.g. Schoen et al. [2008]) and that failed proposal’s replacement,
the Multiple State Plan currently being implemented by the federal government.
A better estimate of cost-shifting would also inform the most fundamental debates
about competition in the market for unscheduled care, as Medicaid is often claimed
to induce cost-shifting despite a complete lack of evidence either for or against the
assertion.
24Although the opposite effect (low public rates driving low private rates) can occur seemingly
in the absense of such conditions, e.g. in White [2013].
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Thus non-profit hospitals can act like for-profit hospitals (Duggan [2002]), and for-
profit partnerships can behave altruistically (Dranove 1988). The longstanding ques-
tion of what non-profits maximize may thus be considered as having another di-
mension: size. This brings out new questions in the context of the medical sys-
tem related to horizontal integration and physician behavior. For instance, whether
chains of physician practices are more likely to selectively discourage visits by low-
reimbursement patients than individual practices.
This thesis takes as its object of study the unscheduled care market, consisting of
some aspects of primary care clinics and emergency departments at the extremes,
and in between retail clinics and urgent care clinics (described in Section 1.3). In the
context of this episodic care market (i.e. without the fabled longitudinal relationship
with a primary care provider), firms may be more constrained, because they lack the
trust that comes with an ongoing relationship, or less constrained, because of the
same ability to ignore a person with whom one does not have a relationship that
underlies the under-valuation of “statistical lives” relative to observed lives25.
Finally, the emphasis on the unscheduled care market brings new light to the original
objective function dilemma, that of non-profit hospitals. I identify a specific phe-
nomenon (emergency department wait times) that may be the distortion resulting
from a specific constraint (the inability to turn way uninsured patients).
1.4.5. Objective function of individual clinics
While the question of what non-profits optimize has centered around hospitals, for
free-standing outpatient clinics the questions are somewhat different, because virtu-
ally all were historically structured as partnerships of a small number of individual
25Witness the disparity between public funding of Provenge vs. vaccination campaigns.
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physicians. Even now, the majority remain partnerships, although they are merging
with and into larger firms and hospital systems at an increasing rate. They are thus
for-profit entities, but run by a small number of individuals with various professional
obligations that may cause them to forgo profit in certain circumstances (this assump-
tion is inherent in the various supplier-induced demand models in which physicians
trade off the internal cost of deviating from what they believe to be the ideal treat-
ment option in order to induce the desired profit level, although in practice physician
altruism may be limited - Gruber and Owings [1994]).
The major consideration of the objective function of outpatient clinics has come
from the demand inducement literature. Demand inducement is the concept that
physicians can create demand for their own services by making recommendations
that are different than what they would have been were they not profiting from the
additional service provided . In essence, it is a statement about the objective function
of the handful of physician worker-owners who comprise the typical outpatient clinic.
The platonic ideal is a firm whose decisions are made as a perfect agent–they take
only the patient’s interest into account. The “inducement,” then, is the introduction
of the firm’s profit into the objective function at all. This conceptualization of the for-
profit practice contrasts with that of the non-profit hospital, where the dual objective
functions include both profit and some variety of social welfare, although the weighting
between them must be empirically determined.
Initially, demand inducement was considered to be costless (Evans 1974, Fuchs 1978)26.
Later models incorporated a cost in various ways. Pauly (1980) considers the patients
to be Bayesians updating their priors as to whether the physician agent is acting in
26A criticism of this model is that it implicitly requires physicians to not be profit maximizers
(Dranove 1988); yet if they are not maximizing profit, they are presumably doing so for altruistic
reasons, which implies a cost to choosing care not in the patient’s best interest.
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their own best interests. The cost is therefore borne in the form of reduced demand
for future services. Further review of the theoretical models is provided in Dranove
[1988].
1.5. Outline
In Chapter 2, I test the theoretical model developed in Section 1.2, which predicts
that hospital emergency departments will increase their wait times in response to
increasing proportions of low-reimbursement insurance patients among low-severity
visits, but that wait times will decrease in response to lower patient volumes. This
chapter utilizes the AHRQ HCUP State Emergency Department Databases to test
the theory. Cross-sectionally, hospitals with higher levels of uninsurance have sub-
stantially greater wait times. To better assess causality, I utilize three approaches:
hospital fixed effects, using the area uninsurance rate as an instrument for the hos-
pital’s uninsurance rate, and difference-in-difference across the Massachusetts health
reform. The first two approaches demonstrate significant and substantial increases
in wait times due to higher uninsurance rates. The latter approach does not, possi-
bly due to simultaneous reforms and mandates surrounding emergency department
crowding.
Urgent care clinics might also serve as a semi-exogenous disruptor of the emergency
department status quo. To utilize the clinics in service of studying the impact of the
uninsured on emergency department wait times in Chapter 3, I first provide evidence
that urgent care clinics pull substantial patient volume from emergency departments,
but that this effect does not change the proportion uninsured in nearby EDs, using
data from two large, non-profit emergency departments in northern Delaware. To
causally attribute the effects to the clinic entry, I utilize Census block fixed effects,
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cluster by Census tract, and identify off of the change in distance to the nearest clinic
when a clinic enters. I find large decreases in the volume of visits from the less severe
patients (5.6% decline in emergency department visits per clinic which enters), but no
evidence that the for-profit competitors are selectively taking Medicare and private
insurance patients over Medicaid and the uninsured. I then use similar regressions to
those in Chapter 2 to examine the model’s prediction for situations where there is no
change in reimbursement mix that there should be no change in wait times, and find
that, indeed, the changes in wait times are minimal.
This project will contribute to the existing literature in four ways. First, to the
extent that wait times are a form of quality, it adds to the very limited econometric
literature on quality competition, a domain with theoretical roots dating back to
Abbott and Dorfman-Steiner (Abbott [1953], Dorfman and Steiner [1954]) but with
limited empirical evidence (Matsa [2011]).
Second, it helps answer the policy question of whether urgent care clinics should
be regulated or instead encouraged. States have enacted numerous regulations with
differentially impact UCCs (see Section A.3). Were urgent care clinics shown to have
positive spillover effects on emergency departments such as reduced crowding, the
rationale for these laws might evaporate. Conversely, these entrants might break the
cross-subsidization of care for the uninsured that existed in the status quo before
the ACA. The resultant loss to a portion of the population must then be balanced
against the increased access to unscheduled care and potentially lower marginal costs
of treatment that UCCs provide. Additionally, costly policies to induce primary care
clinics to provide more unscheduled care to their patients, such as the ’medical home’
concept have been adopted. Findings in support of urgent care clinics having neutral
or positive effects on EDs, such as those in Chapter 3, then make them a prime
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alternative solution to such PCC-centric policies.
Third, it brings empirical analysis of the various theories of how objective functions
vary by ownership structure to the outpatient setting, where they have not been
studied to date.
Finally, this project will help understand fundamental aspects of current, historical,
and future hospital behavior with respect to capacity and wait times. By using urgent
care entry and insurance expansion to study emergency department behavior, we may
be able to quantify the welfare spillover that occurs when wait times are used as a
filter to discourage unprofitable patients. Proposals to disincentivize this behavior
can then be assessed. For instance, Disproportionate Share (DSH) payments are
made to hospitals on a fairly discrete basis. Their replacement in the PPACA by
insurance expansions (which for Medicaid might not mean additional revenues but
for exchange plans will) should mean potentially greater profitability as a continuous
function of the number of patients in the ED means that hospitals may face less
of a disincentive to discourage uninsured patients from seeking care. Similarly, the
addition of emergency departments to the Federally Qualified Health Center program–
legitimizing unscheduled care as a valid consumer choice amongst many–might prove
welfare-improving despite the additional fiscal cost if it reduced wait times as well.
HHS might also add wait times to its Hospital Value-Based Purchasing initiative as
a quality metric.
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CHAPTER 2 : Emergency department uninsurance as a determinant of
wait times
2.1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the claim at the heart of this thesis, that emergency departments–
the largest of the unscheduled care firms–respond to higher proportions of low-reimbursement
outpatients in the context of constraints against turning away patients or increasing
price by decreasing patient-observable quality.
As the law which prevents EDs from turning away patients was put into place in 1986,
I cannot observe changes in hospital behavior before and after its implementation.
Instead, I will utilize three different sources of exogenous variation in the rates of
uninsurance. The first, instrumenting for the emergency department’s uninsurance
rate with the area uninsurance rate (Section 2.4), is a relatively pure test of the the-
oretical model outlined in Section 1.2 in that it isolates the proportion of uninsured
patients in the absence of large changes in the overall volume of patients in the emer-
gency department (due to moral hazard, the uninsured visit emergency departments
weakly less than the insured of all kinds). The remaining two sources of exogenous
variation both induce large volume changes.
One of these models exploits the change in wait times across Massachusetts’ health
reform (Section ??). This reform ocurred in a non-representative setting and had
diverse effects, including occurring during a period where emergency department
crowding was being specifically addressed by various mandates. For instance, am-
bulance diversion was banned in 2009, with a six-month phase-in period beginning in
2008. Nevertheless, the insurance expansion was a substantial component of reform.
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Reform in Massachusetts appears to have decreased emergency department volumes
(Miller [2011]), complicating interpretation of the minimal observed changes in wait
times.
The final set of models analyze how hospitals change their wait times in response to
increased market pressure resulting from entry of urgent care clinics (UCCs)–clinics
which specialize in unscheduled care for the less severe cases. Because so little is
known about the effects of urgent care clinics, they are modeled in their own chapter,
Chapter 3.1.
2.2. Data sources
2.2.1. Clinic location data
2.2.1.1 Emergency departments
ED location data came from the American Hospital Association database (EDs) and
was geocoded using a custom script utilizing the Bing Maps or Google Maps appli-
cation programming interface1.
2.2.1.2 Urgent care clinics
The Urgent Care Association of America (UCAOA) agreed to provide counts of the
number of addresses on their mailing list in each ZIP code in 2012 (see Figure 5).
These addresses are mailing list addresses, but the list began from a systematic survey
conducted in 2008 (Weinick et al. [2009a]), at which point all met the UCAOA’s
definition of an urgent care clinic laid out in Section A.2. Subsequent additions were
added according to the UCAOA’s membership expansion rather than systematically.
1Available at https://github.com/gsk3/taRifx.geo.
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Figure 5: Urgent care clinics, count and per capita count by county
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2.2.1.3 Historical UCC data strategy
The Urgent Care Association of America provided UCC data for the handful of other
studies of UCCs in the literature. However, that data is not available for years prior
to 2012. Because of the rapid growth rate amongst urgent care clinics (1/3 opened
in the past 5 years - Weinick et al. [2009b]), I assume that all regions had 0 clinics in
2005, interpolate linearly, and address the resulting measurement error statistically.
2.2.1.4 Change-of-support problem
Where data comes from different areal units that do not nest entirely within each
other, there is no perfect method to align the data. Since Census blocks and tracts
are designed to nest within counties, this problem arises in the data for this project
when utilizing data at the ZIP code level, as with the UCC location data.
The proper solution to this problem is to propagate the uncertainty that results
through the entire statistical model. The models which do this are Bayesian and
not particularly tractable for large problems (Banerjee et al. [2003]). Instead, I ap-
portioned results according to the proportion of each ZIP code’s area lying within
each county (see Figure 6 for an illustration of this process, and Figure 5 for the
interpolated result)2.
2.2.2. Area health system factors
The Area Resource File supplied county covariates on provider density and population
insurance rates.
2Doing this at high resolution took approximately twenty days of computing time, but it only
needs to be run once for each variable for the entire project.
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Figure 6: Change-of-support problem interpolation strategy. ZIP 1 nests entirely
within one county; ZIPs 2 and 3 do not. Clinics within ZIPs 2 and 3 are apportioned
between counties in proportion to the fraction of their area contained in each county.
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2.2.3. Population data
All population data not in the ARF was obtained from the U.S. Census. Data used
is at the smallest available level of aggregation for which data is available.
2.2.4. Waittimes and clinical emergency department data
2.2.4.1 State Emergency Department Database
The State Emergency Department Database (SEDD) of the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality’s Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (AHRQ HCUP) pro-
vides data on measurements of emergency department competitive responses. The
SEDD contains a census of patient records from the majority of EDs in each state (see
Table 16 for completeness data). Fifteen states in the SEDD contain AHA database
identification numbers (see Table 15), allowing each emergency department to be in-
dividually identified and geocoded. Most of these are available from 2005-2010, with
2011 pending release (see Table 17).
This dissertation utilizes 2005-2011 Massachusetts and New Jersey data from the
SEDD, with MA data available approximately every other year due to its expense.
Variables of interest for EDs include metrics of patient-observable quality such as
crowding (measured through wait times, diversion hours, boarding, numbers of pa-
tients who left-without-being-seen, and occupancy rate3), proxies for unobservable
quality in the area’s providers (e.g. Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions), and pa-
tient volumes for different submarkets within the unscheduled care market (number
of TSPC, UC, and EC seen). Of these, the latter two (volumes and ACSCs) are avail-
able directly in the SEDD. Duration data (total time spent in ED by each patient) is
3The ratio of the number of ED patients to the number of ED treatment “bays”McCarthy et al.
[2008] or ED physicians.
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also available in the SEDD, and is used to impute wait times as described in Section
2.2.4.4.
2.2.4.2 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey
The National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS) is an annual,
nationally-representative sample of ED visits in the U.S. To produce the NHAMCS,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health Statis-
tics first samples 350 EDs. Each of these EDs are then contacted by subcontracted
Census Bureau employees to randomly sample and abstract 100 patient records from
a random month. Response rates are approximately 90%.
In addition to a variety of abstracted clinical data, the NHAMCS has collected data
on wait times since 1997.
2.2.4.3 Emergency department competitive response data
The SEDD does not natively contain wait times, but does contain a variable measuring
the total time spent in the emergency department. This measurement of the total
ED time can be decomposed into,
TotalT ime = TriageT ime+WaitT ime+ ClinicianT ime+DispositionT ime
, where TriageT ime is the time from the door to completion of triage, WaitT ime
is the time from completion of triage to being seen by a clinician (physician or
NP/PA), ClinicianT ime is the time from when the patient is first seen by the clin-
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ician to when the clinician gives the order to either admit or discharge the patient,
and DispositionT ime is the time from when that decision is made to when the pa-
tient leaves the ED by foot or gurney. Because TriageT ime, ClinicianT ime, and
DispositionT ime all should be strongly correlated within a severity type (and less
correlated with ED crowding than WaitT ime), using TotalT ime–while controlling
for each case’s severity through the inclusion of the large number of case variables
available through the SEDD–should correlate strongly with the true variable of inter-
est.
2.2.4.4 A strategy to correct wait time data from the SEDD
The NHAMCS measures wait times. Because the NHAMCS public use files do not
contain geographic identifiers for each ED, it has only been used thus far to study
aggregate patterns of wait time relationships (Pitts et al. [2012]). I use relationship
between wait times and overall duration in the NHAMCS (adjusted for detailed clin-
ical, demographic, temporal, and health system covariates as described in Table 1) to
predict wait times from duration data in the SEDD. While this still estimates only
the mean relationship and leaves considerable room for the three other components
to be unobservably correlated with market structure, it should go a long way towards
reducing bias.
Table 1 shows 10 variables in common between NHAMCS and SEDD, comprising 543
variable levels after diagnosis codes appearing fewer than 50 times were excluded4.
4There may exist as many as 63 variables (representing 1,709 dichotomized levels when categori-
cal variables are ’dummied out’) which have consistent definitions between the SEDD and NHAMCS,
including the total duration of the visit. Some (e.g. uninsurance) were omitted out of concern that
including them in the prediction equation would invalidate their explanatory ability in the main
analysis. Others (typically hospital characteristics) were omitted because another dataset would
need to be purchased and the explanatory power they might add was not thought to be sufficient to
justify the expense.
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Characteristics Variable Number of levels
Patient Gender 2Age (Continuous)
Hospital Region of the country 4
Disease Diagnosis (ICD-9-CM) 521Admitted to hospital 2
Time
Time of arrival (hour:minute) (Continuous)
Month of arrival 12
Year of arrival (Continuous)
Weekend arrival 2
Total ED length-of-stay (Continuous)
Table 1: Variables used in NHAMCS-SEDD imputation
These variables were regressed on the individual visit’s wait time in the NHAMCS
in a linear regression model. The model’s R2 was 0.21; by comparison, a 23-question
evaluation of average wait times at various times of day by trained observers in a
narrowly-defined set of institutions (Weiss et al. [2004]) yielded an R2 of 0.49 com-
pared to measured data. Using that relationship, I predicted each visit’s wait time,
and plotted predicted waittimes vs. individual (Figure 7) and median hospital mea-
sured wait times (Figure 8), using a 10% holdout sample.
The concave relationship in Figure 8 is clearly non-linear, suggesting that linear
regression may not be sufficiently flexible for optimal prediction. However, highly
non-linear supervised machine learning techniques such as the random forest model
(Breiman [2001]) and the Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines algorithm (Fried-
man [1991]) failed to substantially improve prediction accuracy. Furthermore, variable
selection/regularization methods such as Lasso/Ridge regression (Tibshirani [1996])
failed to reach convergence.
Overall, the prediction accuracy seems sufficient; any measurement error resulting
from the imputation will be handled by the regression models in the analysis phase.
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Figure 7: Predicted vs. measured individual wait times in NHAMCS
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Figure 8: Predicted vs. measured median hospital wait times in NHAMCS
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Because it does not specifically only measure waiting time, the imputation strategy
can be seen as an economically-relevant improvement over measured wait times in
the sense that it accounts for strategic delays (“foot dragging”) once the clinician has
first seen the patient.
2.3. Demonstrating that hospital uninsurance rate is the relevant unit of
analysis
There is a substantial body of literature on physician behavior that demonstrates
that physicians typically choose a practice style (determined by their overall reim-
bursement mix) and apply it to all their patients consistently rather than discriminate
on a case-by-case basis. For that reason, I assume in all the models that the whole
emergency department’s proportion of low-reimbursement patients is what dictates
their behavior vis a vis wait times. Figure 9 provides evidence of this effect using
NHAMCS data. Hospitals are divided into insurance quartiles, and median wait times
for each hospital insurance quartile are displayed separately for individual insured and
uninsured patients. There are no substantial, significant differences at the individual
level, but major differences at the hospital level of uninsurance. Regression models
include individual and hospital uninsurance terms (and in general they show that the
hospital term is significant and substantial whereas the individual term is not).
2.4. Cross-sectional, fixed-effect, and instrumental variable analysis
I first investigate whether wait times are indeed higher in hospitals emergency depart-
ments with a high proportion of uninsured patients using cross-sectional regression
on a 0.1% sample of the AHRQ HCUP State Emergency Department Databases for
New Jersey (2004-2011 inclusive) and Massachusetts (2005, ’07, ’09, ’10, and ’11).
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Further models attempt to infer causality, rather than mere association. Next, I
examine whether hospital-specific changes in the proportion of uninsurance are asso-
ciated with higher wait times by including hospital fixed effects. I then re-estimate
the cross-sectional regression, this time instrumenting for the emergency department’s
proportion of uninsured patients with the uninsurance rate of the county in which the
hospital is located. Finally, I apply both the instrument and fixed effects in a single
model.
2.4.1. Regression equation
The full regression equation is,
yiht = α + βXiht + γLht + δvht + ζh+ ηT + iht
, where yiht specifies the individual visit imputed wait time, α estimates the intercept,
Xiht represent detailed clinical and demographic covariates (including indicators for
whether the visit was made by a Medicaid or uninsured patient), Lht contains the
hospital’s proportion of Medicaid and uninsured patients, h are hospital fixed effects
(in certain models), T are year fixed effects, and vht provides the number of visits to
that hospital in the same hour of the same month of the same year (the day of week
of the month is not available but whether it is a weekend day or not is available and
included in this contemporaneous number of visits calculation).
2.4.2. Ordinary least squares and instrumental variable analysis
Instrumentation may be helpful: the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reports a p value of <
0.01, suggesting that hospital uninsurance rates are endogenous to factors influencing
wait times. Area uninsurance rate as an instrument is not weak (crude correlation of
0.78 with ED uninsurance rate).
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Coef SE
year 0.0053 0.0053
female 0.000014 0.0015
race 0.0021 0.0015
age -0.0001 0.0001
ndx 0.0010 0.0020
npr -0.0015 0.0063
died 0.0181 0.0200
nchronic 0.0047 0.0023
aweekend -0.0012 0.0020
unins 0.0294 0.0116
mcaid 0.0016 0.0026
mcaidHosp 0.0238 0.0447
uninsCounty 1.83 0.14
Table 2: First stage of hospital waittime models (dependent variable: uninsHosp), all
states, 1% sample.
First stage instrumental variable regression results are shown in Table 2.
Results are presented in Table 3.
Interestingly, the coefficient on hospital uninsurance rates increases after instrumen-
tation, implying that the elasticity of demand with respect to wait times for the
uninsured is higher than for the non-uninsured. This could be the case if the unin-
sured have access to more information about which hospitals have high wait times, or
are more sensitive to high wait times because a higher proportion of their outpatient
care is delivered in emergency departments.
2.4.3. Fixed effect and instrumented fixed effect regressions
The next set of regressions uses within-hospital variation over time in uninsurance
rates and wait times to attempt to discern a causal trend.
Unfortunately, because the data in question is a short, unbalanced panel (see Table
4), common tests of stationarity (Adjusted Dickey-Fuller, KPSS, etc.) failed or were
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year 2.051* 1.069 1.560 -3.599**
(0.92) (0.94) (1.06) (0.95)
female -0.057 -0.148 -0.099 -0.257
(0.55) (0.55) (0.48) (0.49)
race 0.387 0.084 -0.134 -0.138
(0.27) (0.28) (0.30) (0.22)
age -0.014 -0.010 0.007 0.010
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
ndx 0.695+ 0.740* 0.803 0.700**
(0.35) (0.35) (0.52) (0.24)
npr 1.625 1.547 0.453 0.633
(1.36) (1.32) (2.13) (1.36)
died -5.305 -5.959 -7.181 -7.413
(7.08) (7.02) (11.49) (9.24)
nchronic 1.241+ 1.006 0.979 0.968*
(0.64) (0.67) (0.43) (0.38)
aweekend -0.720 -0.740 -0.624 -0.425
(0.47) (0.46) (1.12) (0.52)
unins 1.873* 0.477 1.819 1.939**
(0.83) (0.99) (1.22) (0.73)
mcaid -0.990 -1.069 -0.573 -0.503
(0.66) (0.67) (0.97) (0.66)
uninsHosp 57.458** 79.362** -4.626 641.166**
(7.41) (6.69) (16.42) (108.73)
mcaidHosp -12.315* -6.775 18.408 69.204**
(5.49) (5.72) (10.74) (11.73)
nVisitRelative -17.345 -53.254 52.993 161.052**
(58.62) (60.84) (116.76) (49.02)
_cons -4032.691* -2060.152 -3063.139
(1845.95) (1886.26) (2130.77)
N 46928 46928 46928 46926
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemporaneous Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
+p < 0.1
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Hospital wait time models for all years, all states, 1% sample.
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MA NJ
2004 0 1271070
2005 1191659 1343110
2006 0 1372915
2007 1271947 0
2008 0 0
2009 1317059 1512937
2010 1275490 1487052
2011 0 1541375
2012 0 0
Table 4: Number of observations in 2.5 percent sample, by state and year
not valid. Granger Causality using Vector Autoregression is similarly problematic.
Instead, I take two approaches. The first is visual. Figure 10 plots each hospital’s
uninsurance rate and mean wait over time. While the overall impression confirms the
fixed effect regression’s result of a positive association, it is far from clear what the
optimal lag is.
The second approach is to simply run the same regression with different lags of the
hospital uninsurance rate (p = 0, 1, 2...).
2.4.4. Sensitivity analysis for imputed wait time
These models all utilize the imputed wait time as the dependent variable. Table 5
shows the same models as above, run using the total duration of stay in the emergency
department as the dependent variable, rather than only the wait time. The effect,
while notably noisier largely, remains.
As a placebo test, I estimate the OLS regression from Section 2.4.2 on the non-wait
time (duration in the ED minus the imputed wait time). The hospital uninsurance
coefficient from that model is -20.4 with a standard error of 59.
This result is in some sense unsurprising, given the two previous regressions on the
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Figure 10: Plot of uninsurance rate vs. mean hospital wait time over time, by hospital
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year 0.837 -1.097 2.174 -15.737**
(4.79) (5.77) (2.82) (4.60)
female 2.951 2.770 2.116 1.568
(2.84) (2.81) (1.58) (2.38)
race 5.329* 4.733* 2.675* 2.660*
(2.08) (1.95) (0.53) (1.08)
age 0.465** 0.474** 0.505** 0.518**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)
ndx 20.214** 20.301** 22.033** 21.673**
(3.94) (3.89) (0.88) (1.15)
npr 52.555* 52.402* 52.552+ 53.174**
(21.48) (21.22) (15.04) (6.59)
died -188.366* -189.654* -190.459 -191.265**
(94.89) (94.29) (129.39) (44.85)
nchronic 14.682* 14.219* 12.658 12.618**
(5.93) (5.88) (4.68) (1.83)
aweekend 0.317 0.278 2.938 3.628
(2.80) (2.79) (6.13) (2.53)
unins 18.676* 15.928+ 17.546 17.962**
(8.61) (9.53) (9.15) (3.55)
mcaid -0.676 -0.833 -0.120 0.125
(4.29) (4.25) (7.52) (3.19)
uninsHosp 76.709 119.827+ -9.815 2231.977**
(64.08) (71.19) (124.95) (527.61)
mcaidHosp 56.761 67.667 14.848 191.180**
(49.34) (47.71) (60.23) (56.90)
nVisitRelative 841.435 770.750 3098.721+ 3473.833**
(1149.38) (1163.67) (815.23) (237.86)
_cons -1323.309 2559.611 -4024.659
(9625.04) (11608.09) (5683.19)
N 46928 46928 46928 46926
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
+p < 0.1
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Hospital ED duration models for all years, all states, 1% sample.
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other two components. Wait time showed the hypothesized effect. Total duration
of stay in the ED showed a similar effect but with increased noise. We now see the
noise, without the signal.
Moreover, as discussed in Section 2.2.4.4, the imputation procedure has the benefit
of capturing all extensions to the patient’s waiting other than the expected treat-
ment time, including clinician “foot-dragging” (extending treatment times for the
uninsured).
2.4.5. Between-state differences
As discussed in the introduction, Massachsetts enacted policy changes which directly
targeted emergency department crowding at the same time it was expanding insur-
ance. Therefore, the most direct test of the hypothesis put forth in this thesis is
not available for empirical exploitation. Results for the models presented above run
separately for the two states as well as a balanced panel of only the years where data
was available for both states is presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8.
They show that New Jersey’s estimates drive the results to a substantial degree,
consistent with Massachusetts having larger variation in hospital and area uninsurance
over time but also directing policy actions against the dependent variable.
See the appendix (Tables 19, 20, and 21) for models with the measured duration as
the dependent variable.
2.4.6. Differences by ownership type
Section 1.4.4 describes the various models of hospital objective functions might vary
by ownership type, what predictions that makes for behavior, and how those pre-
dictions have withstood empirical scrutiny thus far. This section contributes to the
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year 2.409* 2.519* 2.104 -5.416**
(1.13) (1.12) (1.17) (1.69)
female 1.037 1.041 0.838 0.897
(0.85) (0.84) (1.10) (0.87)
race -0.050 -0.900* -0.164 -0.146
(0.32) (0.41) (0.56) (0.38)
age -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.007
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ndx 1.171** 1.333** 0.844 0.255
(0.40) (0.46) (0.84) (0.42)
npr 2.589 1.813 1.651 0.345
(2.07) (2.06) (2.34) (2.12)
died -20.408* -21.894* -21.659 -24.415
(9.46) (9.07) (14.72) (17.50)
nchronic 0.976 0.703 1.645 1.898**
(0.83) (0.88) (1.09) (0.64)
aweekend -0.814 -0.660 -0.615 0.350
(0.74) (0.75) (2.03) (0.95)
unins 2.405* 0.739 2.332 -0.104
(1.03) (1.37) (1.43) (1.21)
mcaid -3.207** -3.491** -3.138+ -4.379**
(1.11) (1.12) (0.92) (1.39)
uninsHosp 44.027** 102.590** 13.616 2442.460**
(13.56) (22.87) (38.87) (512.32)
mcaidHosp 6.805 -5.570 22.246 176.106**
(8.38) (10.58) (17.05) (34.70)
nVisitRelative -72.770 -84.166 39.593 251.885**
(60.25) (73.79) (124.11) (73.61)
_cons -4741.035* -4969.227* -4125.581
(2278.13) (2252.93) (2343.04)
N 23952 23952 23952 23950
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6: Hospital wait time models for New Jersey, 1% sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year -0.298 -18.257+ -0.578* -1.815
(0.85) (10.83) (0.04) (1.26)
female -1.291* -2.507* -1.222 -1.260*
(0.59) (0.98) (1.09) (0.56)
race 0.905* 2.724* -0.204 -0.203
(0.42) (1.33) (0.10) (0.26)
age -0.014 -0.032 0.018 0.018
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
ndx -0.365 0.556 0.437 0.423
(0.47) (0.99) (0.21) (0.29)
npr 0.528 1.959 -1.823 -1.773
(1.58) (3.26) (2.63) (1.95)
died 6.845 -0.269 4.824 4.810
(9.58) (12.98) (4.97) (10.34)
nchronic 1.158 0.712 -0.151 -0.156
(0.97) (1.68) (0.95) (0.46)
aweekend -0.866 -0.967 -0.732 -0.721
(0.58) (0.77) (0.26) (0.59)
unins -1.936+ -3.205 -1.237 -1.140
(1.15) (2.10) (0.44) (1.13)
mcaid 0.256 0.455 1.129 1.160+
(0.80) (0.77) (0.20) (0.67)
uninsHosp 10.260 957.094+ 22.105 84.832
(16.51) (492.00) (3.51) (57.16)
mcaidHosp -17.704+ -103.961+ 4.086 5.773
(9.79) (55.93) (1.30) (11.93)
nVisitRelative 20.360 -13.928 41.809 69.026
(208.22) (458.97) (449.18) (389.14)
_cons 687.785 36779.918+ 1235.376*
(1711.56) (21774.40) (58.44)
N 22976 22976 22976 22976
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 7: Hospital wait time models for Massachusetts, 1% sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year -1.201 -1.608+ -0.746 -4.640**
(0.81) (0.82) (0.12) (1.66)
female -0.524 -0.629 -0.520 -0.626
(0.53) (0.54) (0.08) (0.47)
race 0.707* 0.445+ 0.112* 0.112
(0.27) (0.26) (0.01) (0.21)
age -0.023 -0.019 -0.002 -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
ndx 0.822* 0.883* 1.120 1.072**
(0.40) (0.39) (0.74) (0.23)
npr 2.799 2.900+ 1.062 1.226
(1.73) (1.62) (3.36) (1.41)
died -5.355 -5.545 -7.770 -7.833
(9.47) (9.50) (17.51) (9.46)
nchronic 1.768* 1.544* 1.331 1.342**
(0.72) (0.74) (0.39) (0.37)
aweekend -1.157* -1.179* -0.935 -0.898+
(0.52) (0.52) (1.56) (0.50)
unins 1.913+ 0.595 1.706 1.746*
(0.99) (1.10) (1.91) (0.75)
mcaid -0.316 -0.362 0.214 0.268
(0.63) (0.64) (0.13) (0.62)
uninsHosp 53.796** 74.422** 15.183 295.185*
(9.00) (9.02) (4.16) (114.83)
mcaidHosp -12.170* -5.995 4.517 21.021
(6.12) (6.43) (4.88) (13.20)
nVisitRelative -43.416 -85.708 160.463 194.727*
(132.09) (136.89) (154.49) (92.35)
_cons 2501.554 3317.619* 1574.176+
(1620.78) (1657.08) (239.70)
N 38356 38356 38356 38353
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 8: Hospital wait time models for balanced panel, 1% sample.
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literature by re-analyzing the main specifications (OLS and IV) of Section 2.4.2 above
for public, non-Federal hospitals; not-for-profit, private hospitals; and for-profit hos-
pitals. Estimates on these sub-groups are based on a 2.5% sample to obtain adequate
numbers of visits for the for-profit and public ownership categories. The results are
shown in Table 9.
There is a suggestion of a trend in the ordinary least squares models, with public,
non-Federal hospitals having the lowest association between increased uninsurance
visitation and wait times, not-for-profit hospitals having higher association, and for-
profit hospitals having the highest association. However, due to the low number of
for-profit and public hospitals in the data, the standard errors are quite large on this
hospital-level variable, despite having 13,606,505 visits in this sample (11,209,478 non-
profit, 296,981 for-profit, and 456,384 public). The instrumental variables analysis in
the context of so few data points leaves estimates so unstable as to be uninterpretable,
with standard errors an order of magnitude larger than the estimated coefficients.
2.5. Ruling out hospital up-triaging of low-reimbursement patients as a
potential mechanism
One possibility for hospitals to increase the proportion of high-reimbursement patients
in their ED is to up-triage low-reimbursement patients relative to high-reimbursement
ones, ensuring that Medicaid and uninsured patients are seen more slowly. Dafny
found that hospitals respond to price changes by “up-coding” to higher-reimbursing
DRGs, and that for-profit hospitals did so more than non-profit hospitals (Dafny
[2005]). However, interviews with clinicians5 suggest that up-coding in the triage
system would be difficult, as patients are cognisant of the wait times of other patients,
5K.V. Rhodes and B.G. Carr.
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Estimate Std. Error Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -4.2e-05 0.77
unins -0.014 0.017
medicaid -0.0017 0.04
medicare 0.039 0.048
dual -0.025 0.042
age -0.0029 0.0011 *
ahour -2e-07 4.8e-05
amonth 0.0064 0.0051
aweekend 0.0012 0.039
ayear 0.016 0.004 *
female 0.02 0.037
region -0.018 0.015
admithos -0.024 0.035
urbanrur 0.018 0.0074 *
ethun -0.00013 0.00013
raceun 0.042 0.024
Table 10: OLS of triage score vs. insurance plus detailed diagnosis
and triage nurses tend to be among the most experienced nurses in the ED and have
a strong sense of pride in their work.
To investigate the possibility that up-triaging occurs, I attempted to fit a cumulative
link model to the data. Unfortunately, several implementations of ordered probit and
logit all failed to converge. Consequently results presented in this section are for an
OLS regression of the numeric triage score (1-5, with higher scores being less urgent)
as follows:
triage = unins+medicaid+medicare+dual+age+ahour+amonth+aweekend+
ayear + female+ region+ admithos+ urbanrur + ethun+ raceun+ dx1
, where dx1 is a detailed clinical diagnosis. Table 10 shows the results of that re-
gression. Despite having 2,576 observations, the coefficients which indicate visits by
uninsured or Medicaid were small and not significantly different from zero (p=0.42
and 0.97 respectively).
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Because this analysis confirmed the clinicians’ prior that up-coding would not be
prevalent in the triage system, the rest of this analysis considers each hospital ED to
make a single decision about the inputs that produce wait times, possibly in accor-
dance with its case mix.
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CHAPTER 3 : The impact of urgent care clinic entry on emergency
departments
A source of somewhat exogenous variation in emergency department outpatient reim-
bursement mix is the entry of urgent care clinics. Urgent care clinics have proliferated
at nearly a 9% compound annual growth rate (Weinick et al. [2009b]), yet little is
known about their impact on the health system as a whole and the emergency de-
partment safety net in particular. Because little is known about these clinics, this
chapter is divided into two sections. Section 3.1 utilizes data from a two-hospital
system in northern Delaware and a spatial regression strategy to determine the vol-
ume and reimbursement mix effects of urgent care entry on emergency departments.
It finds that urgent care entry reduces the number of visits to nearby emergency
departments substantially, but alters the reimbursement mix only minimally. Sec-
tion 3.2 then performs similar regressions to those of Chapter 2, utilizing the SEDD
data with imputed wait times to assess the impact of urgent care entry on emer-
gency department outpatient crowding. It is thus a falsification test of the model
advanced in Section 1.2: if urgent care entry does not change the proportion of unin-
sured, then despite altering the competitive dynamics of an area it should not alter an
emergency department’s wait times1. Indeed, unlike the similar regressions in Section
2.4, difference-in-difference and difference-in-difference-in-difference analysis of urgent
care entry demonstrates that clinic entry does not seem to alter nearby emergency
department wait times substantially.
Throughout, I use ESI (triage) codes 4 and 5 (semi-urgent and non-urgent) as a proxy
for care that could have been seen either in an ED or in an urgent care center, which
1Although consideration must be given to a mechanical effect of reducing wait times in the short
term by reducing patient volume without reducing hospital capacity.
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roughly accords with previous work on the subject.
3.1. The effect of urgent care entry on emergency department volumes:
Evidence from northern Delaware
3.1.1. A description of the northern Delaware data
This section seeks to understand the impact of urgent care centers on nearby emer-
gency department (ED) patient visitation patterns. Because urgent care centers are
not subject to the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (which mandates
that emergency departments provide a clinical screening exam and, effectively, treat-
ment to patients regardless of ability to pay), they might take only those patients
who can afford to pay, leaving EDs with a higher proportion of uninsured patients to
serve. Particular consideration is given to understanding the effect of insurance status
on volume changes and to describe differences by the type of urgent care facility (e.g.
corporate vs. physician ownership).
This section examines the first-order effect of competition between urgent care clinics
and EDs: that they reduce emergency department patient volumes. It examines pa-
tients in Emergency Severity Index (ESI) triage categories 4 and 5, as those are the
most likely to have visits substitutable with urgent care. The effect of urgent care
entry on the volume of insured patient visits to the emergency department is exam-
ined. The next section (3.2) then examines the second order effect, the emergency
department response.
3.1.2. Data
This is a retrospective study of the impact of new urgent care clinics on patient
volumes at two large emergency departments in the Christiana Care Health System.
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We obtained a limited number of variables on every patient visiting the ED over an
approximately 8-year period. All visits were included if the patient underwent triage
at one of the two studied emergency departments. Visits were excluded from study if
they resulted from a direct admission to hospital without triage in the ED or carried
a gynecologic or obstetric diagnosis, as these cases were not seen in the Emergency
Department due to a separate triage system seen in a different part of both hospitals.
3.1.2.1 Sampling Method and Data Analysis
Two datasets form the basis of this study: a facility-level database of urgent care
centers located near CCHS and patient-level retrospective ED data from CCHS. The
two datasets are linked by geography and time.
This data structure allows the use of a spatial regression model. This is a regression
model with Census block fixed effects and quadratic terms measuring distance to the
nearest urgent care clinic, clustered at the Census tract level to account for spatial
autocorrelation. Census blocks are extremely small areas consisting of approximately
50 houses. Census tracts are aggregations of census block groups (themselves aggre-
gations of census blocks). In the study area, the average census tract consisted of 82
blocks.
The combination of Census block fixed effects and continuous distance means that
the model identifies the effect of urgent care by comparing the change in volume of
ED visits for those census blocks close to where each urgent care clinic opens to those
further away.
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Figure 11: Map of urgent care clinics and emergency departments in northern
Delaware
3.1.3. Description of study area
All visits from patients living within 10 miles of either study hospital were included2.
This area consists primarily of a single county in northern Delaware, although small
pieces of New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland are included as well. Figure 11
maps the clinic locations. Figure 12 shows the log population density by Census
block in a choropleth map of the study area.
2Results not sensitive to a 15-mile inclusion radius.
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Figure 12: Log population density (2010 Census) by Census block in northern
Delaware
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3.1.3.1 Unscheduled care locations of the Christiana Care Health System
The Christiana Care Health System during the study period consisted of two hospi-
tals, each with their own emergency department. The Christiana Hospital Emergency
Department is the 24th-largest in the country3. The Wilmingon Hospital Emergency
Department sees approximately half as much volume. The health system also oper-
ates 4 urgent care clinics, 2 which opened during the study period and 2 which opened
beforehand.
3.1.3.2 Unscheduled care competitors
We located 21 urgent care and retail clinics in northern Delaware through an extensive
search of insurer network lists, phone and business databases (Yellow pages, RefUSA),
the Merchant Medicine database of urgent care clinics, and interviews with local
clinicians. We found both longstanding and newly-opened clinics. 4 were owned by
the studied health system, Christiana Care Health System. 2 were retail clinics. 5
were owned by MedExpress, one of the largest national chains of UCCs. 10 were
independently-owned. This pattern of ownership largely mirrors that found in the
national survey of UCCs conducted in 2009 by Weinick et al. [2009b]. Attempts to
conduct a phone survey of these clinics to obtain more detailed information on each
were unsuccessful.
Retail clinics Two retail clinics owned by Walgreens Pharmacy operate in the area.
Their opening dates are unknown. The impact of these clinics on hospital ED volumes
is likely minimal, as the typical retail clinic sees very low volumes. For both these
reasons, they are not included in this study.
3http://www.christianacare.org/trauma
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Urgent care clinics Delaware is a unique practice environment for urgent care
clinics. The state has had a longstanding restriction on the use of the term “urgent,”
with associated facilities requirements that effectively preclude its use. Consequently,
these facilities go by a variety of idiosyncratic names, and are licensed as “Medical
Aid Units.” While this may signal a willingness on the part of the state to restrict
entry of urgent care clinics, the ability to block entry appears anecdotally to be quite
limited.
7 clinics were already open at the beginning of the study period. 12 clinics opened
during the study period. Figure 13 shows when each clinic opened.
The urgent care clinics opening during the study period varied by ownership type.
There were 5 independent clinics at the beginning of the study period, and 5 more
opened during the study period, for a total of 10 independent clinics by the end of
the study period. MedExpress, a large chain operator of UCCs, established a new
presence in this market, opening 5 of 5 clinics within a single year (2012) timeframe.
Christiana Care Health System began the period with 2 clinics, and opened 2 more
during the study period, for a total of 4 clinics. Figure 13 shows opening dates
graphically, and Figure 11 shows a map of the urgent care clinics and emergency
departments.
3.1.4. Effect of urgent care entry on emergency department patient volume
3.1.4.1 Unadjusted estimates
Figure 14 shows the number of visits to each of the two study hospitals by week. The
vertical panels display data for each hospital (CCH = Christiana Hospital ED, WED
= Wilmington Hospital ED). The horizontal panels show the visit counts by acuity.
Acuity here is divided into two categories, based on the five triage codes. Codes 1
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Figure 14: Number of visits to CCHS hospitals per week, by acuity, insur-
ance type (high reimbursement = Medicare+Private; low reimbursement = Medi-
caid+uninsured), and hospital (CCH = Christiana Hospital ED, WED = Wilmington
Hospital ED). Vertical lines represent the date an urgent care clinic entered.
and 2 are combined into an “emergent” category, representing severe cases that are
substitutable between EDs but are not capable of being seen at urgent care clinics.
Codes 4 and 5 are combined into a “less urgent” category which is generally substi-
tutable across EDs, urgent care clinics, and primary care clinics. A subset of these
visits may also be substitutable across retail clinics. Code 3 (omitted) represents the
intermediate case, with indeterminate substitutability. The plot is further separated
by insurance type, with categories created based on having similar reimbursement
rates in the MEPS (see Appendix, Section A.6). The high reimbursement insurance
category represents visits from patients with Medicare or private insurance. The low
reimbursement category represents visits from patients with Medicaid or who lack
insurance entirely. The vertical dashed lines represent the date an urgent care clinic
entered, and are color-coded by type.
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3.1.4.2 Spatial regressions
The results of the regression approach using Census block fixed effects and including
a quadratic term for the distance to the nearest urgent care clinic are shown in Table
11. The model (Model 1) is run separately for the two hospitals as well as both
hospitals’ data combined:
#visitsit = distUC it + distUC
2
it + t+ i+ 
Where i indexes Census blocks, t indexes months, and distUC measures the distance
to the nearest urgent care clinic in miles. The model includes block (i) and month (t)
fixed effects (1,197,210 block-months), and is clustered at census tract level (mean 82
blocks per tract).
Each hospital’s model is also run in a form that allows examining the effect of insur-
ance status. In this Model 2, the distance to nearest clinic is interacted with payer
type (high-reimbursement vs. low-reimbursement insurance, lri) to assess differential
effects by patient profitability:
#visitsit = distUC it + distUC
2
it + lriit + distUCit ∗ lriit + distUC2it ∗ lriit + t+ i+ 
3.1.4.3 Results: Patient volume
Results of the spatial regression with patient volume as the dependent variable are
presented below. Three different regressions were run, one overall, one including an
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indicator of insurance status, and one including both insurance status and clinic type
indicators. The coefficients on distUC and distUC2 are interpretable as the increase
(decrease) in the number of visits per Census block when the distance to the nearest
urgent care clinic increase (decreases) by a mile. In order to aid interpretation, Table
11 includes a final row which gives the percentage change in the number of visits to the
emergency department implied by those coefficients. This percentage was calculated
as the percentage change in the implied number of visits at the mean distance from
an urgent care clinic compared to a move closer by the mean change in miles.
Total volume The estimates from the spatial regression imply that total volume
decreases by approximately 5.6% per urgent care clinic that enters.
By insurance status The estimates do not differ by insurance status, although
this may be due to a lack of power after clustering at the Census tract level.
By ownership type Table 12 shows the results of separating out the distance to
the nearest urgent care clinic by ownership type: chain-owned (MedExpress) urgent
care clinics versus independent clinics (neither owned by CCHS nor Med Express).
When interacting by chain ownership vs. independent physician ownership of the
urgent care clinics, the chain-owned clinics seem to impact ED volume more than the
independent urgent care clinics. The effect for chain-owned clinics is not, however,
differential by insurance status.
3.1.4.4 Results: Ambulatory care-sensitive conditions
Table 13 presents results from three regressions of the number of visits to Christiana
emergency departments for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions (ACSCs) using cen-
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Variable Coefficient
distMedExpress 0.0058* (0.0024)
distMedExpressˆ2 -4.7e-05* (2e-05)
LRI 0.0821* (0.0299)
distIndependent -0.0057 (0.0083)
distIndependentˆ2 0.0012 (0.0009)
Month -0.000227* (3.3e-05)
LRI X distMedExpress -0.0036 (0.0033)
LRI X distMedExpressˆ2 2.8e-05 (2.7e-05)
LRI X distIndependent 0.026 (0.0162)
LRI X distIndependentˆ2 -0.0046* (0.0018)
Table 12: Regressions of number of visits versus distance to nearest urgent care clinic
of different ownership types, with block fixed effects, census tract clustering
Variable % ACSC Overall % ACSC Prevention % ACSC Substitution
distUC -0.0007 (0.006) -0.0012 (0.0023) 0.0005 (0.0056)
distUCˆ2 -0.0004 (0.0008) 0.0001 (0.0003) -0.0006 (0.0008)
Month 0.00038* (2.3e-05) 3.1e-05* (9e-06) 0.00035* (2.2e-05)
Table 13: Regressions of number of visits for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions
versus distance to nearest urgent care clinic, with block fixed effects, robust standard
errors
sus block fixed effects and robust standard errors. ACSCs were selected from the
standard list (Billings et al. [2000]) on the basis of clinical presumption about which
would be particularly relevant in this setting. I categorized ACSCs into those whose
effect on ED visits would be primarily through preventing a visit, and those whose
effect is likely mediated primarily through substituting an ED visit for one in another
setting. The full list of conditions used is included in Table 22.
After selecting several ambulatory care-sensitive conditions likely to be responsive to
urgent care entry, I find no difference in the proportion of ambulatory care-sensitive
conditions as a result of urgent care entry. Ambulatory care-sensitive conditions cap-
ture many dimensions of quality by many firm types, including primary care clinics,
urgent care clinics, and emergency departments. They may be a reflection of patient-
unobservable quality on the part of urgent care clinics, or they may be observable to
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patients. This ambiguity means interpretation is difficult, but the findings here com-
bine with those of Reid et al. [2013], who used a matching design to demonstrate that
those who visit retail clinics show no difference in subsequent receipt of preventive
care, to suggest that large gaps in certain aspects of measurable clinical quality are
unlikely to exist, despite differences in ownership and organizational structure.
3.2. The effect of urgent care entry on emergency department wait times
Having determined that the overall effect of urgent care clinics on nearby hospital
emergency department patient volumes is to substantially decrease the total number
of patients entering emergency departments, but not do so differentially by insurance
status4, this section examines the empirical effect of urgent care entry on hospital
emergency department wait times.
The theoretical model (Section 1.2) would predict that a decrease in volume without a
corresponding change in the insurance case mix should be accompanied by no change
in wait times. Added to this is the mechanical effect of reduced volumes decreasing
wait times, although in the medium- to long-term this effect should be muted as
capacity adjusts to the new steady-state. Overall, then, we should expect a neutral
or slightly negative impact of urgent care entry on nearby emergency department
wait times. Any effect is likely an upper-bound due to the endogeneity of urgent care
entry, as explained in Section 3.2.1.1.
3.2.1. Empirical model to estimate the competitive response of EDs
While the ideal experiment would randomize emergency department entry (or at
least exploit some plausibly exogenous variation in the profitability of opening a new
ED), ED entry and exit are fairly uncommon events–in an average year, fewer than
4Within the bounds of the statistical power of the analysis.
79
2% of EDs close5–and ED entry and closure are associated with a whole host of
confounding factors such as the entry of the associated hospital and the challenging
market conditions implied by an area which can put an entire hospital out of business,
respectively. Instead, I will use the entry of urgent care clinics into a market as a
disruptor of the unscheduled care market.
This section first outlines a difference-in-difference model, which allows for the dis-
cussion of threats to causal inference in a simpler setting as well as approaches to
mitigate those threats. It then describes a difference-in-difference-in-difference model
which more closely parallels the analytic question above, and investigates whether
this triple differences model differs by the prevailing insurance rate as well.
I propose the following difference-in-difference estimate:
1. 2007 vs. 2011
2. Markets with UCC entry vs. markets without
The estimating equation for the regression form of the model is:
yi = β0 + β1Xi + β2Ei + β3ti + β4 (Ei · ti) +mi + i
Where:
• i indexes observations (a particular patient visit to a particular ED in a partic-
ular market)
• Xi are covariates
5“From 1990 to 2009, the number of hospitals with EDs in non-rural areas declined from 2446
to 1779, with 1041 EDs closing and 374 hospitals opening EDs” Hsia et al. [2011].
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• Ei indicates an area that experiences entry in the second period
• mi are market fixed effects (indicator for whether case i is in the mth HSA
• ti is the year
• yi is the time that patient spent waiting in the ED
The model is clustered at the hospital level. An alternative specification adds a third
difference across hospital insurance case mix.
The next section considers the confounding that remains in this model in the next
section.
3.2.1.1 Threats to inference
For valid inference, we need to satisfy several assumptions. First, that markets in
which UCCs enter are not unobservably different than those which do not: cov (i, Ei) =
0. Second, that cov (i, ti) = 0. And finally, that there are no differential trends:
cov (i, Ei · ti) = 0. These concerns about the point estimate can be divided into
those concerning internal validity and those concerning external validity, whereas the
primary concern with the uncertainty associated with that point estimate is that of
autocorrelation.
Internal validity The ability of the regression to estimate the causal effect of
urgent care entry on emergency department wait times for the population of clinics
like those which appear in our dataset (internal validity) might be compromised in
several ways.
Urgent care clinics might prefer to enter markets which are trending towards higher
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ED wait times. This would biases the estimation towards the null.
Alternatively, UCCs might choose to enter markets which are trending towards lower
ED wait times. This would be problematic, but it is contrary to profit maximization.
Instead, there could be some unobserved, underlying variable. For instance, dense
areas might see a greater pace of systematic reform which affects wait times and
because of the density of customers also experience more unoservably desirable entry.
This would be problematic, but it is difficult to conceive of even an implausible story
that would fall in this category (the preceding example is non-problematic because
population density is observable to the econometrician).
Finally, expectations may begin impacting ED wait times before UCC entry–the
“Ashenfelter dip.” Fortunately, the direction of this bias is likely towards the null,
and concerns about differential trends can be addressed by analyzing the pre-trend.
External validity One concern which remains is that urgent care clinics might
choose to enter markets on which they can have the biggest impact in reducing wait
times. This is likely because those markets are where unmet demand for the rapid
service of the entrants may be highest. This is a serious concern, but one of external
not internal validity, so we can bound the estimate. Because this is a dimension
that UCCs are optimizing when they make entry decisions, the causal estimate of the
effect of UCCs on ED wait times reflects an upper bound of impact. Clinics first enter
markets where they will have the largest impact on wait times; when those markets
are ’taken,’ they move on to moderate impact markets, and so forth.
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3.2.2. Results
Table 14 shows the results of the double-difference and triple-difference regressions.
The first column, the difference-in-difference analysis, shows that an additional urgent
care clinic in the hospital’s 3-digit zip led to no significant change in wait times
(coefficient: year * zip3_pointcountUC).
The second, third, and fourth columns examine the differential effect of urgent care
entry by the degree to which it changed the proportion of low-reimbursement insur-
ance at that hospital emergency department. The coefficients on the triple-difference
estimator (yearXzip3UCXlriHosp) are all extremely small and not statistically signif-
icant for all definitions of low-reimbursement insurance: uninsured, Medicaid, or the
combination of the two.
A significant limitation of this analysis is that urgent care clinic counts are only
available for 2012. Because nationally approximately 1
3
of clinics were newly opened
in the prior 5 years (Weinick et al. [2009b]), I assumed that in 1997 each 3-digit
ZIP area had 0 clinics and interpolated linearly between. This results in substantial
measurement error. However, given that the coefficients on the difference estimators
were not only statistically insignificant but close to zero, the measurement error would
have to be substantial indeed in order to produce a falsely negative result–even a
trebling of the coefficients would be insignificant from a clinical and policy perspective.
Bias should be limited, except in the case that newer clinics are much more/less likely
to open in places where they might have a large impact on emergency department
wait times.
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D-D Uninsured Medicaid Both
b/se b/se b/se b/se
year -0.076 0.058 1.167*** 0.962***
$? (0.21) $? (0.23) $? (0.23) $? (0.23)
zip3UC 206.143 622.784* 776.072** 824.708**
$(149.54) $(264.00) $(256.32) $(269.82)
year * zip3UC -0.102 -0.310* -0.386** -0.410**
$? (0.07) $? (0.13) $? (0.13) $? (0.13)
lriHosp -14617.699*** -21.077*** -11.139*
$(3,651.36) $? (5.60) $? (4.83)
zip3UCXlriHosp -1638.193 -2714.656 -2796.951
$(1,421.54) $(1,434.74) $(1,485.14)
yearXlriHosp 7.311*** 0.025*** 0.029***
$? (1.82) $?? - 0 $?? - 0
yearXzip3UCXlriHosp 0.815 1.351 1.392
$? (0.71) $? (0.71) $? (0.74)
Constant 221.938 -53.24 -2274.005*** -1862.936***
$(426.03) $(464.37) $(456.30) $(452.51)
R2 0.004 0.024 0.026 0.024
N 6403530 6403530 6403530 6403530
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
Table 14: Urgent care double- and triple-difference regressions. zip3UC is the number
of urgent care clinics in each 3-digit ZIP code.
84
3.3. Summary of urgent care’s impact on emergency departments
This chapter has demonstrated that urgent care clinic entry reduces the volume of
emergency department visit but does not, in the aggregate, seem to alter its case
mix. It then tested the implication of the theoretical model presented in Section 1.2
that, absent a change in case mix there should not be a change in wait times. The
model passed this falsification test. Yet the findings of this chapter have implications
beyond the test of the particular thesis of this dissertation.
Because of the origins of emergency departments as places for the treatment of high-
acuity conditions, the cultural view of EDs as being inappropriate for lower-severity
care is fading only slowly. There are many competing explanations for why this
should be, and why it might change. For instance, perhaps traditionally hospitals
feared competing for low-severity patients because they needed PCPs for referrals,
but with the decline of direct admissions from primary care as a revenue source they
no longer fear this backlash. It may be that EDs really are inefficient places to deliver
lower-severity care, and that EMTALA imposes a binding constraint with resulting
welfare losses–or it may be that time-sensitive care has a high fixed cost (of being
open 24 hours per day) and that both EDs and UCCs can deliver it efficiently once
EDs are reoriented towards serving a broader spectrum.
On the other hand, urgent care clinics may have adverse effects on the health system,
including costs. While they represent lower-cost competitors to emergency depart-
ments, the true marginal cost of emergency department care is unknown, given the
presence of substantial market distortions. The volume pulled from emergency de-
partments is substantial, but represents less than 20% of the typical 40,000 visit
annual volume of an urgent care clinic (Weinick et al. [2009b]). If the remainder of
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visits come not from primary care but from the “woodwork effect”–demand increasing
when non-price costs decrease–the urgent care may increase resource-use. The efforts
of certain insurers to shift demand from EDs to UCCs provides some reassurance on
that front.
Just as these questions about the unscheduled care market are intrinsically inter-
esting, there are as many opportunities to extrapolate from the particulars of this
market to the questions which concern economists about markets in general. It re-
mains unknown, for instance, how closely firms co-locate when they want to compete,
and what factors determine this decision. The unscheduled care market offers further
possibilities to study older questions, such as the nature of competition along qual-
ity dimensions. To that end, it is notable that urgent care entry did not decrease
wait times, but perhaps unsurprising given the sensitivity of quality to competition
depending on the assumptions of the games used to model it reviewed in Section
1.4.1.
Intriguingly, when considering the type of for-profit clinic that enters, ownership
type (independent vs. chain-owned) does not seem to affect case mix. This finding
contrasts with Chakravarty et al. [2005], who find that non-chain for-profit hospitals
more tightly target profitable demographics. The substantial differences between
hospitals and urgent care clinics make the failure to find such an effect in this market
unsurprising, but the finding point to the need for caution in extrapolation.
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CHAPTER 4 : Conclusions
This dissertation posits and presents evidence of a market distortion which has re-
ceived little economic attention to date: the apparent mismatch of supply and demand
in the market for unscheduled care delivered at hospital emergency departments. It
puts forth a specific hypothesis, that supply has not expanded to meet increased de-
mand due to a set of norms and regulations that acts as a binding constraint against
increasing price for a particular class of customers, the uninsured. It demonstrates
that those constraints do, in fact, seem to bind. The hypothesis is then formally
modeled by maximizing the profit function of a hypothetical emergency department.
The predictions of the comparative statics of this model–that hospitals with high
uninsurance rates will choose policies that cause high wait times as a filter for un-
profitable patients–are then brought to the data in a variety of ways, with the con-
clusion largely holding. While this does not rule out other explanations which drive
similar predictions (most notably, the alternative that resource constraints in emer-
gency departments with unprofitable case mixes are what drive high wait times), the
hypothesis-driven nature of this research, combined with the formal model’s predic-
tions being borne out in the data, are suggestive.
Several policy implications follow naturally from the findings of this dissertation.
The theoretical model’s central assumption is that hospitals can neither turn away
patients, due to the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, nor increase only
unprofitable patients’ wait times, due to a combination of legal, reputational, and
soft regulatory constraints. As is typical of well-intentioned regulation, unintended
consequences can be severe1. While the example of countries without EMTALA-like
1Indeed, DSH payments might have done more to mitigate the effect were they crafted to reim-
burse hospitals on the margin of treating another uninsured emergency department patient.
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laws makes it clear that such laws bring many benefits, they should be designed
as carefully as possible to mitigate their harms. Even absent narrowly-crafted laws,
insurance expansion should help reduce the adverse consequences of high uninsurance
burdens coupled with an inability to collect for certain cases. Indeed, we should expect
the rate of growth of emergency department crowding to slow or reverse, particularly
in states which expand Medicaid relative to those that do not. Monitoring of this
natural experiment over the coming years will serve as a significant test of this thesis.
This prediction gives rise to several further policy conclusions. First, there may be
a substantial welfare gain from insurance expansions due to reducing the externality
imposed on the insured visiting hospital with high wait times due to high hospital
uninsurance rates. Given the size of the crowding problem and the frequency of
emergency department visits, this welfare effect may substantially offset some of the
less positive welfare effects of the PPACA for those who were already insured before
the implementation of the law. Second, calls to mandate particular solutions to
emergency department crowding (Rabin et al. [2012]) may be sub-optimal if insurance
expansion will reduce crowding without the distortionary effect of trying to mandate
uniform operations solutions across an entire country. Third, Medicaid fees should
be cautiously monitored. Medicaid patients are currently more profitable than the
uninsured by a moderate margin. If fees are cut, however, the problem may repeat
itself–there is little predicted improvement in crowding from shifting patients from
being uninsured to being on Medicaid if the average reimbursement rates between
the two equalize2. Similarly, the rise of urgent care poses its own challenges, but also
brings potential solutions to emergency department crowding.
Finally, this dissertation adds to the limited but growing empirical literature on qual-
2Little benefit, rather than no benefit, because the hospital may still prefer a certain Medicaid
payment over a stochastic one from the uninsured.
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ity competition, while drawing specific attention to strategic uses of negative qual-
ity to screen out unprofitable customers. While healthcare’s information assymetry,
agency, intermediaries, moral hazard, adverse selection, and regulation make it the
likeliest market for such negative quality competition, anecdotes such as the “fire
your bad customers” movement suggest that negative quality competition may have
substantial relevance for the broader economy.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Tables and figures
State SEDD (2008) All Payer DB
1 AK - -
2 AL - -
3 AR - -
4 AZ X -
5 CA X -
6 CO - X
7 CT - -
8 DC - -
9 DE - -
10 FL X -
11 GA - -
12 HI - X
13 IA X -
14 ID - -
15 IL - -
16 IN - -
17 KS - X
18 KY X -
19 LA - -
20 MA X X
21 MD X X
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22 ME - X
23 MI - -
24 MN - X
25 MO - -
26 MS - -
27 MT - -
28 NC X -
29 ND - -
30 NE X -
31 NH - X
32 NJ X -
33 NM - -
34 NV - -
35 NY X -
36 OH - -
37 OK - -
38 OR - -
39 PA - -
40 RI X -
41 SC - -
42 SD - -
43 TN - X
44 TX - -
45 UT X X
46 VA - -
47 VT X X
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48 WA - X
49 WI X X
50 WV - -
51 WY - -
Table 15: Data source availability
State No. Hospitals Percent Included
Arizona 64 67.2
California 312 84.6
Florida 184 83.2
Hawaii 23 87.0
Iowa 117 98.3
Kentucky 100 89.0
Maine
Maryland 44 93.2
Massachusetts 62 69.4
Nebraska 85 91.8
New Jersey 63 77.8
North Carolina 106 84.9
Rhode Island 11 90.9
South Carolina 58 79.3
Utah 43 86.0
Vermont 14 100.0
Wisconsin 123 94.3
Table 16: 2010 SEDD hospital completeness, by state
A.2. Definition of an urgent care clinic
Perhaps because urgent care medicine is seen as new and potentially profitable, many
primary care clinics seem to have adopted the moniker alongside one or two features
that make them urgent care-like. For instance, a number of clinics which AT&T’s
Yellow Pages lists as urgent care have barely more than 40 hours per week of clinic
time. Such a clinic is unlikely to have much impact on a neighboring ED’s competitive
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Figure 15: NHAMCS wait time vs. boarding time (conditional on being boarded)
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Figure 16: NHAMCS visit-level wait time vs. triage relationship
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Figure 17: Schematic treatment of the spectrum of unscheduled care
Figure 18: Georgia, an example of clinic location data
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Figure 19: U.S. block group population c.d.f. by distance by entity type
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Figure 20: Wait times vs. insurance and income
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2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
AZ X X X X X X -
CA X X X X X X -
FL X X X X X X -
HI - - - - - - -
IA X X X X X X X
KY X X X - - - -
MA X X X X X X X
MD X X X X X X X
ME - - - - - - -
NC X X X X - - -
NE X X X X X X X
NJ X X X X X X X
NV X - - - - - -
NY X X X X X - -
RI X X X X - - -
SC - - - - - - -
UT - X X X X X X
VT X X X X X X X
WI X X X X X X X
Table 17: SEDD AHA ID availability by year
Immediate Emergent Urgent Semi-urgent Nonurgent No triage
FALSE 76.00 68.30 82.90 95.30 96.40 93.10
TRUE 24.00 31.70 17.10 4.70 3.60 6.90
Table 18: Proportion of patients ever boarded, by triage category, NHAMCS09
landscape. This makes establishing a consistent definition of urgent care critical.
The Urgent Care Association of America has defined an UCCWeinick et al. [2009a]
as a clinic that:
• Provides care primarily on a walk-in basis
• Has evening office hours Mon-Friday
• Has office hours at least one day over weekend
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year 4.691 5.090 3.665 -17.794*
(5.36) (5.12) (4.65) (7.67)
female 4.517 4.530 3.160 3.328
(3.91) (3.86) (2.38) (3.94)
race 1.520 -1.567 2.526* 2.578
(2.46) (3.09) (0.54) (1.74)
age 0.436** 0.425** 0.472* 0.467**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
ndx 23.058** 23.645** 22.432** 20.752**
(5.50) (5.47) (0.86) (1.90)
npr 55.888* 53.072* 51.905+ 48.177**
(25.14) (24.99) (16.22) (9.61)
died -374.436+ -379.831* -374.867+ -382.728**
(186.83) (184.89) (94.95) (79.36)
nchronic 15.429+ 14.437+ 17.453+ 18.174**
(8.09) (8.13) (5.54) (2.92)
aweekend 4.944 5.505 8.053 10.809*
(4.74) (4.80) (8.40) (4.30)
unins 18.698+ 12.649 19.713 12.761*
(10.49) (12.72) (8.06) (5.49)
mcaid -16.038+ -17.069+ -16.287 -19.830**
(9.02) (8.81) (10.04) (6.29)
uninsHosp 234.715* 447.370* 116.708 7047.154**
(115.16) (192.07) (236.60) (2323.46)
mcaidHosp 107.422 62.486 96.720 535.744**
(70.27) (76.25) (80.10) (157.36)
nVisitRelative 1764.176 1722.793 3268.746+ 3874.497**
(1285.76) (1268.15) (765.61) (333.82)
_cons -9168.318 -9996.932 -6967.884
(10792.89) (10306.22) (9134.45)
N 23952 23952 23952 23950
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
+p < 0.1
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Hospital ED duration models for New Jersey, 1% sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year -6.190 -86.726 -6.728* -11.655+
(6.61) (73.11) (0.49) (6.06)
female 2.209 -3.247 0.615 0.461
(4.08) (4.92) (0.76) (2.70)
race 7.196* 15.352 2.269 2.271+
(3.19) (10.07) (1.54) (1.25)
age 0.478** 0.398** 0.541* 0.544**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.03) (0.07)
ndx 15.166** 19.297** 18.594+ 18.537**
(4.11) (6.79) (2.58) (1.38)
npr 35.592** 42.010* 28.222* 28.422**
(11.09) (16.55) (1.40) (9.42)
died 1.483 -30.419 2.666 2.612
(47.84) (63.84) (34.55) (49.92)
nchronic 11.079 9.079 1.772+ 1.754
(7.77) (9.76) (0.17) (2.21)
aweekend -2.469 -2.918 -2.928 -2.885
(3.03) (4.17) (2.69) (2.85)
unins 6.145 0.455 5.342 5.728
(4.62) (9.73) (7.28) (5.45)
mcaid 6.093 6.984+ 7.777 7.899*
(3.79) (3.92) (2.36) (3.22)
uninsHosp -55.776 4190.251 143.684* 393.439
(238.19) (3528.00) (6.46) (276.05)
mcaidHosp -151.842* -538.658 -218.174* -211.457**
(70.88) (388.47) (11.04) (57.60)
nVisitRelative -4647.237** -4801.002* -2231.868 -2123.502
(1460.17) (2092.69) (731.37) (1879.29)
_cons 12888.714 174741.932 13975.181*
(13300.26) (146934.64) (909.85)
N 22976 22976 22976 22976
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
+p < 0.1
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Table 20: Hospital ED duration models for Massachusetts, 1% sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
year -9.815+ -10.970* -9.045* -25.066**
(4.99) (5.39) (0.37) (8.20)
female 1.915 1.616 0.891+ 0.454
(3.13) (3.11) (0.11) (2.34)
race 5.588* 4.843* 2.671 2.671*
(2.23) (2.04) (0.74) (1.06)
age 0.508** 0.521** 0.511+ 0.516**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
ndx 18.950** 19.123** 21.289* 21.091**
(4.25) (4.18) (0.84) (1.14)
npr 39.405** 39.693** 33.713 34.385**
(11.19) (10.95) (7.11) (6.94)
died -56.339 -56.878 -55.420* -55.678
(43.40) (42.62) (3.21) (46.58)
nchronic 11.761* 11.126* 8.682 8.729**
(5.35) (5.23) (3.43) (1.82)
aweekend -5.723* -5.786* -3.532 -3.381
(2.37) (2.35) (3.09) (2.48)
unins 9.442* 5.704 6.082 6.247+
(4.04) (4.50) (3.06) (3.67)
mcaid 4.635 4.506 5.300 5.522+
(3.58) (3.57) (4.98) (3.05)
uninsHosp 39.255 97.807 169.509* 1321.441*
(67.69) (70.92) (12.95) (565.65)
mcaidHosp -34.378 -16.848 -129.382** -61.485
(44.95) (43.75) (1.47) (65.04)
nVisitRelative -3707.108** -3827.162** -146.016 -5.053
(790.58) (806.61) (537.02) (454.92)
_cons 20132.565* 22449.149* 18581.239*
(10022.69) (10828.69) (714.14)
N 38356 38356 38356 38353
Fixed Effects No No Hospital Hospital
Instrumented No Yes No Yes
Clustered Hospital Hospital Year None
Clinical Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. Volume Yes Yes Yes Yes
+p < 0.1
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Table 21: Hospital ED duration models for balanced panel, 1% sample.
99
• Provides suturing for minor lacerations
• Provides X-Rays on site
This definition seems to have a reasonable concordance with what people generally
mean when they talk of “urgent care,” and represents a reasonable competitor for
EDs, yet still encapsulates a large number of clinics for study. Wherever possible, I
will use this definition in my work.1
In the 2009 urgent care survey, 35.0% of the clinics contacted (using a sampling frame
derived from phone books) did not meet this definitionWeinick et al. [2009a].
A.3. State laws affecting urgent care clinics
• Laws with direct effects on the cost of opening a UCC
• AZ mandated licensure of UCCs in 20002
• State drug dispensing regulations for clinics3
• State licensing rules for NP/PAs
• State licensing rules for laboratory, x-ray
• Restrictions on how UCCs can be named and marketed (IL, DL, NH)4
1While this definition is satisfactory, this still leaves open a range of different clinic types, from
UCCs open 24 hours per day capable of running CT scans to much more limited “primary care-plus”
clinics. I will attempt to explore this distinction as well, if data allows. Specifically, I suspect that
UCCs more remote to EDs are more likely to have advanced capabilities, which, absent altruistic
motives, would reflect a decision to compete more directly with EDs in product space when more
separated in geographic space.
2www.touchbriefings.com/pdf/1334/Stern.pdf
3http://aaucm.org/Professionals/MedicalClinicalNews/DispensingRegulations/default.aspx
4http://www.ucaoa.org/resources_newtourgentcare.php
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• Restrictions on non-physician ownership5
• HCA hospital located nearby6
• State auto liability ins. mandates7
• Certificate-of-need laws for UCCs (limited)
A.4. Welfare losses due to ED crowding
ED crowding may cause welfare loss through several mechanisms. First, patients
assigned low-priority triage scores are harmed by the greater economic (time +money)
cost of obtaining care. While the welfare loss due to this time has not been calculated,
the magnitude of the problem is hinted at by the statistic that patients in 2009
collectively spent 7.06 billion minutes (13.4 millennia) waiting to be seen by an ED
clinician 8.
Next, patients with more severe conditions seem to face worsened ED performance as
a result of crowding. ED crowding has been associated with delays in a variety of time-
sensitive processesHwang et al. [2008], Mills et al. [2009], Sills et al. [2011], Pines and
Hollander [2008], Schull et al. [2004], Fee et al. [2007], and increased transit times due
to ambulance diversion likely cause further morbidity and mortality given the well-
established relationship between transit times and outcomes for several widespread
5Texas, California, Ohio, Colorado, Iowa, Illinois, New York and New Jersey
prohibit non-physician ownership under the Corporate Practice of Medicine doctrine.
http://www.ucaoa.org/resources_newtourgentcare.php
6HCA hospitals have recently started demanding up-front payment for all but the most critical
services in the ED, relying on a narrow reading of EMTALA. This effectively increases the price of
UC treatment at HCA EDs.
7Auto insurance pays large amounts for ED care, and thus increases the willingness of EDs to
operate at a loss
8Calculated by summing the 2009 NHAMCS wait times while taking into account the complex
survey design weights.
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acute disease statesCarr et al. [2006], Ting et al. [2007], Souza and Strachan [2005],
Weaver [1995]. Given that the triage system is explicitly designed to prioritize patients
identified early as high-priority, these studies, while concerning, likely represent a
fairly small component of the overall welfare loss.
While the triage system is mostly reliableHay et al. [2001], triage misclassification–
when patients with a high-priority presentation are placed in a low-priority category–
remains a regular occurrence. For instance, 3-5% of all ED patients triaged as ’non-
urgent’ require immediate hospitalization Kellermann and Weinick [2012]. Patients
with serious, time-sensitive conditions such as myocardial infarction (MI) or stroke
face longer delays before treatment if they are misclassified at triage. This may be one
mechanism behind the findings that ED crowding has been associated with worsened
cardiovascular outcomesBernstein et al. [2009], Pines et al. [2009] and even mortali-
tySinger et al. [2010], Sprivulis et al. [2006]. These studies may even underestimate
true effects considerably if their adverse outcomes are not recorded in the ED because
these mistriaged patients leave without being seen. 8.1% of all patients leave without
being seenAsaro et al. [2007], with patients triaged into low-priority categories even
more likely to do soBatt and Terwiesch [2013]), and 60% of cases in one study then
seeking medical attention within a weekRowe et al. [2006].
Collectively, these findings suggest that ED crowding is a problem with large welfare
implications, and the study of its determinants and possible solutions could have
potentially large welfare effects in turn.
A.5. Ambulatory care-sensitive conditions
Selected ACSCs used in this study, categorized by author.
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ICD9 Codes Category Inclusion criteria
Vaccine-related 1 033.* Prevention
Vaccine-related 2 037.* Prevention
Vaccine-related 3 045.* Prevention
Vaccine-related 4 39[01].* Prevention
Hemophilus meningitis 320.0* Prevention Age>=1 & Age<5
COPD 49[1246].* Prevention
Acute bronchitis 466.0* Prevention 2ndary dx codes
Asthma 493.[0-9]* Prevention
Iron deficiency anemia 280.[189]* Prevention Age<5
Failure to thrive 783.4* Prevention Age<1
Pelvic inflammatory disease 614.* Prevention Gender==’Female’
Hypertension1 401.[09]* Substitution
Hypertension2 402.[019]0* Substitution
Gastroenteritis 558.9* Substitution
Kidney/urinary infection1 590* Substitution
Kidney/urinary infection2 599.[09]* Substitution
Dehydration 276.5* Substitution
Dental conditions 52[12358]* Substitution
Table 22: Selected ambulatory care-sensitive conditions categorized into substitution
vs. prevention
A.6. Reimbursement rates and out-of-pocket costs by insurance type
Figure 21 shows data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) consisting
of all 86,918 ED visits from 2008-2011 except the 6,538 visits for newborns or visits
with flat-fee arrangements.
Out-of-pocket and total payments for ED patients were compared across insurance
types. For each, we calculated two statistics: probability of any expenditure, and log
spending conditional on any expenditure. All inpatient expenditures were included
where the visit resulted in admission. Spending was inflation-adjusted to 2011 dollars.
All estimates were weighted to produce national, population-based estimates using
appropriate survey weights.
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Friedman AB, Berdahl CT, Hsia RY, Seabury SA
▪ More patients pay $0 out-of-pocket for ED 
   care than has been previously appreciated
Limitations
▪ MEPS variable linking inpatient with ED ﬁles 
   not present for a substantial number of
   admissions which may bias inpatient 
   estimates
▪ Source of other uninsured payments unclear
Future Directions
▪ Understand the impact of cost-sharing on 
patient health and health-system utilization
Methods
Study Design
▪ Retrospective survey analysis
Data Source
▪ Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
▪ 86,918 ED visits from 2008-2011
▪ Exclusion criteria: Visits for newborns or 
   with ﬂat-fee arrangements (6,538 visits)
Main Outcome
▪ Out-of-pocket and total payments for ED 
   patients, compared across insurance types 
Statistical/Data Analysis
▪ Descriptive statistics
▪ Two-stage regression:
    1) Probability of any expenditure
    2) Log spending among those with any 
        spending
▪ Controls for
    ▪ Age
    ▪ Sex
    ▪ Race/Ethnicity
    ▪ Marital status
    ▪ Rural/urban residence
    ▪ Region
    ▪ Household income
    ▪ Diagnosis code
▪ All inpatient expenditures were included 
   where visit resulted in admission
▪ Inﬂation-adjusted to 2011 dollars
▪ All estimates were weighted to produce 
   national, population-based estimates
The Out-of-Pocket Costs of ED Visits
 According to Patient Insurance Status
▪ Care in the ED is expensive and can result 
   in signiﬁcant ﬁnancial costs paid out-of-
   pocket (OOP) by patients 
▪ The Aﬀordable Care Act will shift patients 
   between insurance types in complex ways
▪ Medicaid expansion increased ED visits in 
   Oregon (Taubman et al. 2014)  
    ▪ Moral hazard (Pauly 1968) likely cause
▪ Comparatively little is known about what 
   patients of diﬀerent insurance statuses 
   pay out-of-pocket for ED care
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Inpatient ED visits
▪ Being admitted from the ED increased 
   average OOP spending from $103 to $301, 
   and total spending from $984 to $11,956
▪ For patients admitted from the ED, 39.8% 
   incurred an OOP expense ($754 average)
▪ Virtually every admission resulted in some 
   revenue for the hospital, except for 5.0% of 
   visits by the uninsured
▪ Average revenue was lowest amongst 
   Medicaid and dual-eligible patients before 
   adjustment and among the uninsured after 
   adjustment
▪ The uninsured paid 7.7 fewer percentage 
   points of the total with their own funds 
   than did the privately-insured
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Outpatient ED Visits
▪ Only 40.9% incurred an out-of-pocket 
   expense, at an average of $253
▪ 94.3% of outpatient visits resulted in some 
   revenue to the ED ($1,043 mean revenue)
▪ Compared to privately-insured, Medicaid 
   and Medicare patients were 45.7% and 
   21.6% less likely to have any OOP expense
     ▪ That expense was 78.2% ($198) and 
        66.6% ($695) smaller when they did
▪ The uninsured paid 24.4 more percentage 
   points of the total expense with their own 
   funds than did the privately-insured
Objectives
▪ Characterize how spending varied by 
   disposition, insurance status
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Figure 21: MEPS p rcent ge with no out-of-pocket spending and overall spending.
This joint work with Seth Seabury and Carl Berdahl was presented at the Society for
Academic Emergency Medicine 2014 Conference (Dallas, TX).
A.7. Motivating model variable handout
Variable definitions
• w∗ is th optimized wait time
• α is the proportion of uninsured in the market
• s is ex ante severity: s = 0 for those less sick, s = 1 for those more sick
• i is reimbursement status: i = 0 for uninsured/Medicaid, and i = 1 for privately
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insured/Medicare patients
• Π(s, i) is the profit to the hospital for a patient of type (s, i)
• ρ is the Pr(prf |i = 0, s = 1)
• piprf is the profit when an uninsured patient is admitted and turns out to be
profitable
• picharity is profit when the hospital cannot recoup the cost
• x indexes utilization: x = 1 if the patient seeks ED care and x = 0 if they
instead utilize their outside option
• σ1 = Pr(s = 1|i = 1, x = 1)
• σ0 = Pr(s = 1|i = 0, x = 1)
Assumptions
• pis=1,i=1 > pis=0,i=1
?
> pis=1,i=0
• Π(s = 0, i = 0) < 0
• Π(s = 1, i = 0) = ρpiprf + (1− ρ)picharity > 0, small
• ∂σ0
∂w
< ∂σ1
∂w
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